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The closing decades of the 20th century saw significant policy developments in the 
movement to improve business compliance with regulatory and tax requirements. 
Previously, controversy about whether a more or less interventionalist approach was 
needed dominated discussions of and proposals to enhance regulation. At the core of the 
debate were the theoretical assumptions about the motivations driving compliance. 
Advocates of the more interventional approach referred to as command-and-control 
regulation assume self-interest motivates compliance and a fear of sanctions deters 
noncompliance. Those arguing for a less interventional approach known as cooperative 
regulation assume civic duty, moral beliefs, fairness and legitimacy of government 
determine compliance. More recently, regulatory and tax agencies have adopted a 
convergence of the two approaches known as "responsive regulation." Responsive 
regulation suggests a wide range of motivations from inadvertent error to self-interest 
influence compliance and, thus, require a broad scope of interventions beginning with 
dialogue aimed at securing and maintaining engagement in the regulatory process and 
ending with a willingness to resort to sanctions when other efforts fail. Investigation 
into motivations that influence compliance, especially in the tax arena, have been limited 
because of the recency of developments. The available research, however, tends to 
support the basic assumptions of responsive regulation. Drawing from interviews with 25 
owners of small building and construction firms, the current study provides an increased 
understanding of compliance in an industry well recognized for noncompliant taxpayers. 
Specifically, it explores participants' taxpaying behaviors and the motivations driving 
V 
their taxpaying and then compares their taxpaying compliance with compliance in other 
regulatory areas. Results suggest that taxpaying among the participants is a complex and 
dynamic process which will probably not be accounted for by one theoretical model, that 
the tenets of responsive regulation may be the more efficacious intervention and that the 
tradition of criminological research may serve well to inform future regulatory and tax 
compliance research. 
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Drawing from economic and classical theories of crime, rational choice theory 
assumes that participation in illegitimate activity is a function of cost and benefit analysis 
by rational actors (Becker, 1968; Comish and Clarke, 1986). Specifically, individuals 
pursue goals reflecting their self-interest and consciously choose to commit a criminal act 
if the expected benefits of illegitimate activity exceed the benefits from engaging in 
legitimate activity. Conversely, the decision to forgo criminal behavior may be based on 
the individual's perception that the benefits are no longer there or that risk of detection 
and subsequent cost of engaging in illegitimate activity is too great. In other words, 
individuals explore their options and choose the alternative with the highest expected 
gain. Contemporary rational choice theorists acknowledge the calculus of criminal 
behavior may on occasion be rudimentary and misinformed but contend that at least some 
consideration and rationality direct choices to participate in crime. This decision making 
process occurs through two fundamental processes (Comish and Clark, 1986). 
First, individuals are heavily influenced by a number of personal factors and 
learning experiences in choosing their behavior. Personal factors may include 
psychological make-up, social and demographic characteristics and background 
characteristics; learning experiences may include direct and vicarious experiences with 
criminal activities, contact with enforcement agencies and development of conscience, 
moral attitudes and self-perception. While other theorists take account of these factors as 
predisposing certain individuals toward a penchant for criminality, rational choice 
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theorists reinterpret these factors as influencing the calculus to commit a criminal act. To 
wit, individuals who conform in many aspects of their lives may commit a criminal act 
and the reverse may also be true. 
Second, individuals are influenced by situational and contextual factors. Some 
individuals are more likely than others to confront situations where the benefits of 
illegitimate activity outweigh the costs. Opportunity, risk of detection, potential 
consequences and necessary skills and information vary particularly for different criminal 
acts. From the rational choice perspective, decision making models should be "crime­
specific"(Comish and Clarke, 1986). 
Rational choice theory assigns the state a strong regulatory role in preventing 
crime by making it "rational" for individuals to behave so as to reduce negative 
consequences. Since businesses by nature operate instrumentally and are typically risk­
aversive, threats weighted against potential gains appear particularly ideal for dealing 
effectively with their noncompliance (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). Noncompliance 
by businesses is seen as willful action by "amoral calculators" who respond to illicit 
opportunity by calculating costs and risks (Kagan and Scholz, 1984 ). The principles of 
rational choice theory, therefore, have served as a base for command-and-control 
strategies to secure business compliance with regulatory rules. Command-and-control 
enforcement incorporates inspections, legal threats and the mechanical imposition of 
penalties for noncompliance. Limits are clearly defined in advance and officials readily 
increase the pressure to comply including the initiation of legal action when limits are 
tested. 
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While command-and-control regulation traditionally dominated discussions of 
and proposals to enhance regulation, a variety of evidence suggested that its adversarial 
nature fosters resentment, mistrust and resistance, at least in some industries and industry 
sections. Persistent doubts about its benefits and effectiveness eventually led to calls for 
programs of cooperative regulation and enforced self-regulation. Such programs are 
distinguished by shared state-corporate responsibility for enforcement and by a wider 
range of official options for responding to noncompliance. 
Advocates of cooperative regulation contend that individuals tend to obey laws 
made and implemented by authorities that are perceived to be legitimate (Tyler, 1990; 
Tyler, 1998). They argue that compliance with regulations is influenced by the extent to 
which individuals accord legitimacy to enforcement agencies. Legitimacy is a normative 
assessment by individuals of the appropriateness or right of enforcement agencies to 
restrict their behavior. Therefore, compliance is higher when individuals accord a high 
level of legitimacy to enforcement agencies. Achieving compliance is not seen as an 
immediate objective but a long-term aim. Preferred methods of enforcement include 
persuasion, negotiation and education. However, proposals for and programs of 
cooperative regulation also came under fire by critics who questioned whether they can 
deliver fairer and more effective outcomes (Snider, 1990; Pearce and Tombs, 1990; 
Pearce and Tombs, 1991 ). 
The punishment-versus-persuasion controversy led Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) 
to propose a convergence of the two approaches known as "responsive regulation." 
Responsive regulation research suggests failure to comply with regulations may result 
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from willfulness but many times it does not. Responsive regulation is grounded in 
hierarchical development and application of enforcement strategies that take into account 
the circumstances and capabilities of differing business entities. Advocates of responsive 
regulation emphasize educating, assisting, and persuading businesses to comply. If they 
fail to comply despite appeals and cooperative actions, officials can escalate their 
responses and sanctions in proportionate fashion. In other words, as the seriousness of 
infractions and the willfulness they represent increase, so do the severity of sanctions. As 
Braithwaite (2002: 30) explains, "It is an attempt to solve the puzzle of when to punish 
and when to persuade." 
Conceptually, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) present their notion of responsive 
regulation in the form of a "regulatory pyramid" which is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Regulatory Pyramid 
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The base of the pyramid is made up of broad cooperative strategies of self­
regulation that emphasize education about rules and provide assistance with complying. 
The top of the sanctions pyramid is represented by a "benign big gun." Ordinarily kept in 
the background, it represents the most severe sanctions in the arsenal of regulatory 
officials. The availability of the benign big gun, ·coupled with officials' clear willingness 
to employ it, serve to push enforcement down toward the base for those who fail to 
respond to assistance or to punish those who commit an offense beyond deterrence or 
refuse to cooperate. This approach to regulation nurtures voluntary compliance while 
displaying a willingness to employ escalating sanctions should the need arise. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 4) suggest officials "be responsive to industry 
structure in that different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of 
regulation." More specifically, effective responsive regulation requires that officials 
understand and take account of the diverse motivational postures taken by those being 
regulated. V. Braithwaite ( 1995) identifies four common motivational postures: capture 
(acceptance and identity with the regulatory system), managerial accommodation 
(incorporation of the firm's own strategies to achieve compliance), resistance 
(confrontation and challenge of regulations), and disengagement (withdrawal from the 
regulatory process). 
Echoing reports of investigators, advocates for responsive regulation contend that 
motivations toward noncompliance are not fixed and immutable but qualities that are 
subject to shift within the dynamics of the regulatory process. Movement in the direction 
of compliance may be accomplished by engaging the owners/managers of business firms 
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in a common regulatory culture with strong social bonds and shared sense of mission. 
This assumes that failure to comply may result not only from willfulness but also from 
ignorance of what is required, from inadvertent errors, or from changes in circumstances. 
In such cases, most are neither resistant to nor disengaged from the system. 
Understanding both diverse motivational sources of noncompliance and the need for 
mutual respect and trust in contacts with business firms is central to improving 
compliance. Thus, business firms who are inclined to comply with the law may be 
strengthened in this posture by officials who treat them as trustworthy if confused or 
misguided citizens while those of a more resistant bent may be nudged toward 
compliance through judicious use of educative efforts laced with a dose of threat. The 
more recalcitrant are another matter for they may need to be reminded of or even 
experience first hand criminal prosecution or loss of their license to do business. 
Investigators have made progress exploring empirically the diverse motivations 
for compliance by businesses across a broad spectrum of regulatory programs. Ashford et 
al. (1985) found that consistency of enforcement and regulation structure most influential 
in motivating businesses to establish and engage in innovative practices to ensure 
regulatory compliance. Genn (1993) interviewed management personnel in a wide cross 
section of firms in England and Wales to learn about their motivations for compliance 
with occupational safety and health requirements. Her study showed that some firms, 
particularly the largest ones, are proactive in their approach while others are more 
reactive. Firms in the former category approach expressed support for and took actions to 
be knowledgeable about and to comply with regulations. Managers of reactive firms by 
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contrast tended to be less informed about regulations and more ad hoc in their compliance 
strategies. Typically, their approach to compliance is confined to implementing 
improvements demanded by inspectors during visits. 
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) asked a sample of 410 Australian nursing homes 
executives to estimate the chances that discovery and sanctions would occur under a 
condition of continued violation of six standards and regulations and to gauge the costs to 
their organization of several sanction types in the event that they were caught and 
penalized. Using qualitative methods to assess cross-sectional self-report and official 
measures of compliance, they found a formal deterrence model to be a "stark failure" 
(Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991: 29). 
Paternoster and Simpson ( 1996) investigated intentions to commit four types of 
corporate crime by MBA students. They found that where participants held personal 
moral codes, these were more important than rational calculations of sanction threats in 
predicting compliance. While sanction threats were found to be somewhat important, 
they concluded that appeals to business ethics were more effective. 
Bansal and Roth (2000) collected interview data on compliance motivations in 
tape recorded interviews with 88 managers in 53 theoretically sampled firms in the 
United Kingdom and Japan. The investigators were interested not only in motivations for 
compliance but also contextual factors that apparently lead to corporate ecological 
responsiveness. Using standard qualitative research techniques of analytic induction, they 
identified three common motivations for compliance with environmental protection 
regulations: competitiveness, legitimation and ecological responsibility. Competitiveness 
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is belief that compliance may hold potential for improving long-term profitability, for 
example, by improved energy and waste management. Legitimation refers to the desire of 
a firm to improve the appropriateness of its actions within an established set of 
regulations. Ecological responsibility refers to the concern that a firm has for its social 
obligations and values. 
May (2002) used a mail survey of 260 residential home builders in western 
Washington to examine attitudes toward compliance with building codes. His data led 
him to distinguish between affirmative and negative motivations. The former are 
grounded in a concern for one's general reputation, demands for homes without defects, 
confidence in building codes and a sense of duty to comply. The latter are grounded in 
fear and potential sanctions associated with noncompliance. Affirmative motivations 
were found to be more effective than negative motivations in producing compliance. 
Research into motivations for regulatory compliance tend to confirm the basic 
assumptions of responsive regulation: "[Improved compliance] will not be accomplished 
by considering [firms] one at a time as value-maximizing unitary actors ... The drivers of 
compliance are plural. By seeing and managing compliance appeals in pyramid fashion 
so that reward and trust are favored strategies at the base and tough enforcement at the 
peak, we can move responsively to improve compliance by mobilizing appropriate drivers 
at propitious moments" (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 2001: 417-18). 
While research into the motivations of regulatory compliance has been of interest 
to social scientists for some time, the same has not been true of investigation into the 
motivations for tax compliance. Because tax authorities have historically relied so 
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heavily on command-and-control strategies of enforcement, research has been dominated 
by economic theorists (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989). Economic theorists concentrate 
on estimating the amounts of revenue lost to untaxed economic activity, gathering 
sociodemographic characteristics of noncompliant taxpayers and building enforcement 
models derived from economic theories. Social science research into tax compliance has 
been limited in volume and empirical knowledge has been "best regarded as pioneering 
rather than definitive" (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989: viii). 
In the past decade, however, social science research into motivations for tax 
compliance has become increasingly necessary due to a shift in tax enforcement 
strategies. In the United States, the president signed into law the Internal Revenue 
Service Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. This act came into law after the 
adversarial nature of tactics used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) met with 
complaints and criticisms from citizens, the press and, in time, legislators. It establishes a 
board that includes private citizens to oversee administration of the IRS, shifts the burden 
of proof in civil cases from the taxpayer to the IRS and deemphasizes enforcement 
actions while increasing taxpayer education initiatives (Lee and Lipman, 1999; Pace, 
2001). 
The challenge for social science research is to identify motivations driving 
taxpayer compliance and translate findings into practical policy recommendations. 
Currently, researchers are limited in their understanding of the motivations driving 
compliance with tax requirements (Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989; Cash Economy Task 
Force, 1998; Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 2001). As a high ranking IRS official 
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notes, "we need to know where groups of taxpayers are having difficulty in complying 
with tax law. That would allow us to more effectively deploy resources to help them 
understand" (Pace, 2001). The next section addresses what has been learned about 




While most citizens consider payment of taxes necessary for a sustainable society, 
this does not necessarily reflect positive regard for tax law compliance. Tax law is often 
considered complex, time-consuming and unfair _leading to justifications for widespread 
noncompliance by certain segments of the population. The largest of these segments 
includes participants in alternative economies recognized by countries worldwide and 
characterized by unreported income (AICPA, 1983; Portes, Castellas, and Benton, 1989; 
Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 2001). In Sweden, this phenomenon is referred to 
as the "secret economy," in Britain as "fiddling," in Russia as the "second economy" and 
in Australia as the "cash economy" (AICPA, 1983; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). In 
the United States, the IRS has subdivided the alternative economy into the "illegal 
economy" and the "informal economy" (AICP A, 1983). The former includes provisions 
of good and services that are illicit such as prostitution, gambling, extortion and drug 
dealings. Being illegal, monetary transactions for services are not reported for tax 
purposes. The latter comprises income derived from legal employment and business 
transactions that are not declared for tax purposes. Typically, income is in the form of 
cash that is not recorded in the books from which the tax return is prepared. Guttman 
(1977) and Fiege (1978) estimate the informal economy makes up two-thirds of all 
unreported income in the United States, and they predict its growth at rates exceeding the 
conventional economy. In 1970, the informal economy in the United States was 
estimated to comprise between 3.6 and 4.6 percent of the total economy (Schneider, 
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2000). By 1998, this estimate had grown to 8.9 percent of the total economy, an increase 
of 168 percent (Schneider, 2000). 
Evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the informal economy is made up 
of "informal suppliers" (Kagan, 1989; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998; Bajada, 1999). 
Informal suppliers are small businesses whose income tends to be received in small 
amounts from customers who generally do not keep records of expenditures (Kagan, 
1989: 88). They conceal their income by using cash transactions with customers and 
suppliers, keeping unsystematic records, selling surplus materials and failing to maintain 
a licensed or fixed place of business with visible assets (Kagan, 1989; Bajada, 1999). 
Business transactions from informal suppliers are difficult to detect because the "paper 
trail" is nonexistent and there is usually no third party reporting. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) approximates that self-employed workers report 36 percent of 
their income and informal suppliers working on a cash basis report 11 percent (Hite, 
1997). 
In the closing decades of the 20th century, revenue losses from the informal 
economy gained the attention of tax enforcement officials and social scientists (Roth, 
Scholz, and Witte, 1989). The former are interested in reversing the trend while the latter 
are interested in the theoretical bases for doing so. The two are united in the quest for 
answers to the question of what motivates some people toward compliance with tax law 
and others toward noncompliance. As noted previously, since command-and-control 
tactics dictated enforcement by tax authorities until recently, much of what is known 
about motivations for tax compliance stems from economic and rational choice theories. 
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Based on this model, taxpayers are deterred from noncompliance and prompted toward 
compliance when they fear detection from audits and criminal investigations and 
punishment through prescribed financial penalties, liens, seizure of assets and federal 
prosecution. 
The deterrence principles of rational choice theory found support among early 
investigations into tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Grasmick and Scott, 
1982; Beck and Jung, 1989). However, more recent research has made clear that 
techniques to improve tax compliance based solely on surveillance and sanctions can be 
inadequate or counterproductive and do not explain voluntary compliance in the absence 
of surveillance (Alm, 1991; Blumetal, Christian, and Slemrod, 1998; James and Nobes, 
2000; Taylor, 2001). Much of this research has relied on investigative tools such as 
surveys of behavior, attitudes and intentions, analytical models, data from tax agencies 
and experimental studies (Taylor, 2001). Variables suggested to influence tax 
compliance include civic and moral duty, trust in government, perception of tax fairness 
and tax identity (Tyler, 1990; McGraw and Scholz, 1991; Mason and Mason, 1992; 
Roberts and Hite, 1994; Taylor, 2001). 
Klepper and Nagin ( 1989) completed an extensive review of the survey research 
conducted on the determinants of tax compliance. They report the following factors to be 
significant: 1) perceptions of the probability of detection of noncompliance; 2) severity of 
informal sanctions when individuals expected public revelation of detected 
noncompliance; 3) moral beliefs about violating tax laws; 4) experience with other 
noncompliers and past experience IRS enforcement (greater experience with both is 
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associated with greater noncompliance); and 5) demographics with older individuals 
engaging in less noncompliance. 
Drawing from the research literature and from theoretical work, Kidder and 
McEwen (1989) suggest a typology of tax compliance and noncompliance and a range of 
influencing factors. These include self-interest, habit, laziness, loyalty, social pressures, 
procedural complexity and tax advisor influence. While not empirically derived, their 
typology is helpful as a "heuristic device [that calls] attention to the rich complexity of 
taxpaying behavior and the need for an ambitious research agenda" (Kidder and McEwen, 
1989: 48). 
Brooks and Doob (1990) sent surveys to 900 randomly selected persons in Canada 
and received a response rate of 33 per cent. Using their survey results, they examined the 
major premises underlying deterrence theory. They found that perception of likelihood 
of apprehension for various forms of tax evasion is not related to whether or not a person 
evades tax requirements and that tax evasion does not appear related to safe opportunity 
to evade. By comparing the responses of evaders and compliers, they concluded that 
deterrence is not a major explanation for tax compliance. They suggested that tax 
decisions may not be made with the sort of careful thought and planning that had been 
originally thought. 
Carroll (1992) collected information from 100 U.S. taxpayers who kept daily 
diaries of tax-related thoughts and behaviors and talked through their major tax 
preparation work in the presence of a research assistant. He found that 60% of all tax­
related statements centered around obtaining a refund and that different factors were 
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significantly related to noncompliance by those participants misrepresenting income and 
by those misrepresenting deductions. The former were related to lower income levels, 
more opportunity for noncompliance, reliance on a tax professional, and fear of detection. 
The latter were related to post season tax knowledge, reliance on a friend or relative as a 
source of information in the prior year, receiving a better-than-expected refund and 
unfairness of tax procedures. 
Noble (2000) utilized interviews with owners and employees of small to medium 
businesses in New Zealand to describe attitudes, perceptions, motivations and behaviors 
linked to tax compliance and evasion. He identified two primary groups of tax evaders: 
those who do pay tax and operate within the tax system and those who do not pay any tax 
and operate outside the tax system. Within the former group, he identified five types of 
taxpayers: non-evaders, opportunists, rebalancers, victims and calculating sharps. Non­
evaders comply with tax law due to their long or short term goals of either making a 
success of the business or enjoying the lifestyle of the business. Opportunists undertake 
undeclared cash jobs for business needs such as those who see undeclared cash jobs as a 
small perk or need undeclared cash income to make enough to survive. Rebalancers 
over-claim expenses due to perceptions of being over taxed or to offset under-claiming in 
other areas. Victims have been unable to pay tax owed because of external circumstances 
such as bad debtors or their businesses no longer trading. Calculating sharps are extreme 
evaders strongly focused on their financial success through evading their tax obligations. 
For the group operating outside the tax system, he identified two types: those who 
actively opt out of the tax system and those who passively opt out of the tax system. 
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Business owners who actively opt out of the tax system may include calculating sharps 
who have been caught or victims who are unable to settle with tax authorities or go out of 
business. Those who passively opt out of the system are typically business owners who 
lack knowledge of their tax obligations. Furthermore, he found that as the amount of tax 
evasion by firms increases, negative perceptions of tax authorities increases as well. 
The Australian Tax Office identified a constellation of factors, known as BISEPS, 
that presumably shape firms' capacity and inclination to comply with taxation 
requirements (Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). This host of business, industry, 
sociological, economic and psychological factors condition the ways typical firms 
perceive and interact with tax and regulatory agencies and personnel. The use of BISEPS 
enables the A TO to tap into industry specific information and target strategies to enhance 
compliance. 
Drawing from the ATO research, Shover, Job, and Carroll (2001: 7-8) describe 
what has been learned about the Australian small building and construction industry: 
Life in the small building and construction industry in Australia is filled 
with uncertainties. The participants are a fairly casual lot who are 
prepared to take risks but are also content to remain small businesses. 
This an industry dominated by males with low literacy levels and variable 
skill levels, many of whom come from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
Distrust of government and fear of the ATO are common. Generally it is 
considered okay to not pay tax, and peer pressure contributes to many 
taking the risk of cheating. These are independent people who like to 
manage their own show. Nearly half of these business owners are sole 
traders, and nearly a third are in partnerships, commonly with their wife. 
The overwhelming majority of them use the services of tax agents, but few 
maintain on-going relationships throughout the year. The business records 
are maintained by the wives. This industry is often faced with economic 
uncertainty and pressures from competition, inflation, and interest rates, 
and the weather. Business relationships are characterized by informality; 
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written contracts are eschewed and a great deal of advertising is by word 
of mouth. Trade regulation is minimal and licensing requirements vary. 
Barter is common, as is the use of cash. The industry norm is that weekend 
work is paid for in cash that is not declared as income. The industry ethic 
is very much one of looking after each other, and the high level of union 
membership illustrates this. There is a strong belief in the "level playing 
field," meaning that everyone in the industry should have an equal chance 
to make a living. 
This research illustrates the existence of many possible motivations and 
justifications underlying the nature of tax compliance and noncompliance. For some, the 
tax system may be considered too complex and time consuming. Taxpayers are not 
secure in their knowledge of the tax system or in the accuracy of their records and returns 
(Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). On the basis of interviews with small building and 
construction business owners in Australia, Shover, Job, and Carroll (2001) found that a 
substantial proportion of respondents believe that little good and potentially a great deal 
of trouble and lost production time can come from contacts with the ATO. A particularly 
colorful representation was given by a plumber and his business partner: 
I mean it's all too hard: that something that should be so simple is made 
so hard. On top of going to work and making a living, we're expected to 
work all our tax out and everything else out, and it's that bloody 
complicated. Chartered accountants can't work it out who trained to do 
that. And yet they want us to do it. I mean, like, how many of those guys 
can come and put up gutters and dig trenches and lay plumbing? Fucking 
none of them! But they expect us to be able to do--to keep our books in-­
absolute perfect order (Shover, Job, and Carroll, 2001: 23). 
There is further perception that tax enforcement is applied unfairly; insufficient 
attention is paid to larger corporations while small businesses are harassed over small 
sums (AICPA, 1983; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998). Survey data from Yankelovich, 





present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the ordinary working man or woman." 
An Australian small building and construction firm owner expressed an opinion of 
unfairness about the taxation system: 
[T]he thing that you'll find in the building industry is that they are 
particularly hostile to the Taxation Department because they sit there and 
they watch multinational companies paying no bloody tax at all [ whilst] 
they are being screwed into the ground. That's where the hostility comes 
from. That's where a lot of cash economy comes from, because there . . .  
is resentment . .. The rates are too high, [and] multinationalists will not 
pay their taxes. And not only multinationals, there are others too. But 
generally the wealthy don't pay their bloody taxes, and that's  where the 
resentment comes from (Shover, Job, and Carroll, 2001: 22). 
This sentiment can be a strong incentive for small businesses to create their own tax 
savings and ignore tax laws (AICPA, 1983). 
Research also suggests the general public is extremely tolerant of cash 
transactions by small business owners. Justifications include "everyone does it at some 
time" and " it does not hurt anyone" (Bardach, 1989; Mason and Mason, 1992; Cash 
Economy Task Force, 1998). Surveys conducted in Australia by the Cash Economy Task 
Force (1998) reveal taxpayers are more tolerant of small businesses in the cash economy 
cheating on their taxes than larger and more established businesses in the conventional 
economy. Noble (2000) reports that the general public in New Zealand does not view 
cash jobs as contributing to tax evasion; evasion was seen only as a problem in cases of 
corporate avoidance or benefit fraud. Additionally, he noted that the public did not see an 
advantage in curtailing the cash economy. Often times, consumers believe that they can 
obtain lower prices through the cash economy and that the community as a whole would 
not benefit from the extra taxes collected from cash businesses. Similarly, many perceive 
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of tax "cheating" as a victimless crime (Bardach, 1989; Mason and Mason, 1992). The 
Cash Economy Task Force ( 1998) notes, "Most people who make donations to charities 
feel positive about it. However, it appears that very few taxpayers send a cheque to the 
ATO with same positive feeling." 
Although the social science research into tax compliance tends to be in an early 
stage of development, it suggests motivations in addition to self-interest and fear of 
sanctions may be of considerable significance. Some of these motivations include civic 
duty, moral beliefs, perceptions of tax fairness, tax complexity and time constraints. In­
depth research is necessary to gain the insights that have been achieved in other areas of 




AND RESEARCH METHODS 
The corpus of research into tax and regulatory compliance has neither a long 
history nor the strong base of generally accepted factual knowledge to match what is 
known about individuals and their noncompliance. The bulk of social science and 
criminological research into compliance has focused on individuals and their behaviors. 
The legacy of past research provides a substantially improved ability to explain, predict, 
and control noncompliance by individuals and has influenced crime control strategies in 
the criminal justice system. There is reason to believe that tax and regulatory 
noncompliance may parallel its individual forms. Research into the criminal calculus 
offers strong arguments for motivations other than utilitarian motivations (Cromwell, 
2003). Similarly, research into the motivations for tax compliance suggests the notion of 
individuals as "amoral calculators" may not be completely accurate. Currently, however, 
we do not know for sure; the research is too limited to make the strong arguments 
allowed in traditional criminological literature. As Wickerson ( 1995: 15) notes, 
"compliance data needs to be supported by more qualitative data which can indicate the 
general nature and causes of noncompliance. Tax administrators need such qualitative 
data in order to determine how to best respond to noncompliance within particular 
populations." 
The current study uses qualitative interviews to explore the taxpaying behavior of 
small business owners in a particular population, specifically the building and 
construction industry. In this method of research, interviews are less structured than 
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survey interviews; researchers ask open-ended questions and elicit specific responses but 
participants are allowed and prompted to explain and clarify their responses (Babbie, 
1998; Cromwell, 2003). It is a method that allows access to participants' knowledge, 
experiences and opinions in their own words (Reinharz, 1992; Rubin and Rubin, 1995 ; 
Johnson, 2002; Warren, 2002). The results of qualitative interviews offer "deep" or 
"thick" descriptive information and understanding of the activity being studied (Johnson, 
2002). 
Understanding the meanings of participants' taxpaying actions are central to this 
study because it allows the researcher to go beyond commonsense explanations (Babbie, 
1998; Johnson, 2002; Cromwell, 2003). For instance, qualitative research into the 
calculus of robbers and burglars, typically considered driven primarily by instrumental 
motivations, reveals expressive motivations may be as much or a more salient 
explanation (Flemming, 2003 ; Cromwell, 2003). Additionally, qualitative investigation 
into gang violence, typically thought to be related to turf and conflict, reveals money and 
drug dealing may be the more important driving factors (Padilla, 2003). Cromwell (2003: 
xi) summarizes the significance of such findings: ''Thus, effective crime control 
strategies must take into account the factors that drive crime. Field research that allows 
offenders to 'speak for themselves' is ideally suited to these studies." 
Research Questions 
Three primary research questions guide the current research. First, what are the 
different types of taxpaying behaviors for the business owners participating in the study? 
More specifically, do they file annual tax statements, claim all income, keep records 
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accurately and state deductions truthfully? Second, what factors shape, influence and 
condition their taxpaying behavior? That is, what drives some owners of small building 
and construction firms to comply with tax requirements while others do not? What 
motivates these business owners to comply with some tax requirements but not other 
requirements? Third, the study investigates the degree to which tax compliance parallels 
compliance with other regulatory requirements? In other words, is compliance with tax 
requirements an unitary or diverse phenomenon? 
Sample 
The small building and construction industry was selected as the focus of the 
study for several reasons. First, smaller businesses have lower tax compliance rates than 
larger, corporate businesses. The IRS-estimated voluntary compliance rate for small 
businesses is approximately 79% as compared with 90% for corporations with assets of 
$1  million or more (Internal Revenue Service, 1983). Second, the building and 
construction industry is well recognized as a principal contributor to the informal 
economy (Kagan, 1989; Sassen-Koob, 1989; Cash Economy Task Force, 1998; 
Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhar, 2001). The IRS-estimated voluntary compliance 
rate for builders is ranked among the lowest of classification codes, approximating that 
less than 60 percent of income is reported (IRS, 1983). Finally, owners of small building 
and construction firms are subject to numerous opportunities for cash income that may 
not be reported to tax officials (Kagan, 1989). Based on surveys of consumers and their 
expenditure patterns, the IRS (1983) found home repair and additions ranked among the 
highest of household purchases from informal vendors by types of goods and service in 
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1981. 
The sample for the study consists of 25 owners of small building and construction 
firms operating businesses in Knox County, Tennessee and contiguous counties. For 
purposes of this study, small building and construction firms are those that employee or 
subcontract no more than five persons at a time. ·The building and construction industry 
comprises different occupational sectors such as carpentry, flooring, landscaping, 
excavation, remodeling and general contracting. 
The sample was obtained through snowball sampling. Initially, participants were 
known personally and agreed to participate in the research project. They provided 
referrals and contacts with other owners of small building and construction firms. Upon 
completion of interviews, participants were asked to provide referrals and contacts with 
other owners of small building and construction firms. Most participants were reluctant 
to do such without first contacting potential referrals themselves. Upon gaining 
permission from potential referrals, participants then gave the researcher a name and 
phone number to contact. Several participants declined requests to furnish referrals or 
contacts. Typically, they explained that they did not feel comfortable asking someone 
else to participate in research related to taxation. A few participants who agreed to 
provide referrals did not call back within a reasonable period of time. On these 
occasions, they were contacted and asked about the progress of securing referrals. In each 
of these cases, participants informed the researcher that the potential referrals had 
declined to be contacted. Many times the owners of small building and construction 
firms do not answer their calls but use an answering machine and messages were left for 
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referrals. Some referrals never returned messages even after several attempts to reach 
them. It was assumed they did not wish to participate in the study. Difficulties in 
eliciting participants limited the sample size. 
Several reasons for the problems experienced in obtaining participants were 
noted. One reason is the personal and sensitive nature of taxpaying. Most persons 
approached about participating in or providing referrals for the study expressed 
apprehension about discussing taxation and personal finances. For instance, when asked 
if they talked about taxpaying with other owners of small building and construction 
businesses, most participants responded that they did not. One floorer stated, "you don't 
'cause that's pretty much your own business. This stuff is really personal." A little later 
in the same interview the participant was asked if he ever discussed taxpaying with other 
people in general. The participant replied, "[I] did not really ever talk to them about it. 
Like I said it's personal. " Another participant who admitted never filing a tax return 
reported conversations about taxpaying were usually limited to talk about filing deadlines. 
This participant revealed: "They say, 'You got your taxes in?' I say, 'Oh yeah. ' I don' t  
even hesitate because I don't want anybody to know [that I don't file taxes]." 
A second reason is that noncompliant persons do not want to risk being identified 
by authorities (Brook and Doob, 1990; Schneider, Braithwaite, and Reinhart, 2001 ). 
Shover, Job, and Carroll (200 1)  found that a substantial majority of small building and 
construction firms identified through A TO files declined requests to be interviewed in 
their study. The researchers were seeking to interview firms/owners who had varying 
degrees of contact with the ATO in the preceding two years. The researchers estimated 
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that not more than 5% of all firms contacted agreed to and completed an interview. Most 
of these owners were tilted toward compliance with tax laws and had no particular reason 
to be wary of sharing their experiences and opinions about the tax office. In the current 
study, many participants were willing to participate only on the condition of 
confidentiality and several wanted reassurance the study was not connected with the IRS. 
Two participants allowed notes to be taken during the interview but refused to be tape 
recorded conveying they did not want to risk being identified at some point. Both of 
these participants admitted noncompliance with tax laws. 
A third difficulty in soliciting participants for the study included the time 
constraints owners of small building and construction firms experience. Most of the 
participants do not have offices they work from and a majority of time is spent manually 
working on job sites. Forty hour work weeks are considered light. Time after work is 
usually devoted to paperwork, returning calls and completing responsibilities at home. 
Interviews with participants and their spouses illustrate the problem: 
PI: How many hours do you put in a week? 
Subject (landscaper): About 40 hours during weekdays and then 
Saturdays. It's physically draining. 
PI: Does that count paperwork? 
Spouse (who works with subject): No, that ' s just the physical work. 
Paperwork is another monster in itself. 
Subject: Yeah, I have already just put in about 3 hours today on it and will 
probably work some more after this. 
PI: Do the hours get to you? 
Subject (general contract): It used to not. It does now. 
Spouse (keeps books and works a fulltime job): You didn't have any kids 
then. 
Subject: You can say I have a mess out there right now and normally I 
wouldn't keep it like that. Tools, trailers, materials, whatever else, from 
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one end of the property to the other. 
PI: What happens? 
Subject: : Well, you got kids, I mean you can only pay daycare for so long 
and realistically I could work seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. 
Spouse: You make sacrifices . . .  if you're working all the time something 
else is going to suffer and that' s either your work or your family. It ' s  the 
things . The lawn doesn't get mowed. It' s  those simple things . . .  Then 
you have to put in that I work over 40 hours a week and you got two kids 
and when you come home the last thing you want to sit down and talk 
about is work. That is such a big effort nowadays especially when it ' s  I 
mean the business consumes so much of our time . . .  
The sample size is smaller than was initially hoped due to these reasons as well as 
time constraints to complete the study. Because the sample is small , nonrandom and 
limited to a specific geographic region, the results of the study cannot be generalized to . 
the bui lding and construction industry as a whole. Limitations are discussed further in the 
conclusion of the study. 
Demographic Characteristics 
Participants ranged in age from their late twenties to their mid-fifties and the 
average age was 36 years old. The sample included twenty-one males and four females 
and all were white. Fourteen participants were married, two were divorced and nine 
were single. Four spouses who assist in business responsibiliti�s participated in 
interviews . Fifteen were homeowners and the remaining ten rented their residences. 
Twenty-two of the participants had a high school education and four had attended college. 
Several participants had training through an apprenticeship or vocational program. Two 
participants had college degrees. 
The overwhelming majority of participants were raised in working class families 
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and a few were from middle class backgrounds. Most of the participants' parents worked 
blue collar type jobs while very few worked as professionals. More times than not, both 
parents worked outside the home. None of the participants reported both parents being 
unemployed. 
Business Characteristics 
As noted earlier, the small building and construction industry includes different 
trades. Many participants contended that they were a "jack of all trades" but when asked 
about a specialty most committed to one particular occupation in the building and 
construction industry. Specialty areas included excavation, flooring/carpeting, 
landscaping, painting, carpentry and glass and door. Several considered themselves 
general contractors. Table 1 summarizes the types of businesses for participants in the 
study. 
An overwhelming majority of participants, specifically twenty-three, operated 
their businesses from home and assumed bookkeeping responsibilities; for the married 
participants, spouses were likely to take on bookkeeping tasks. Two participants ran their 
business out of an office. Of the two, one kept his own records and the other used his 
mother in the position of company bookkeeper. Few of the business owners in the study 
employed regular, full time employees. The two participants working out of an office and 
four participants working out of their home employed regular employees. The other 
twenty-one participants typically used irregular and/or part time workers. Table 2 
summarizes the number of employees/subcontractors by the businesses represented in the 
sample. 
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Table 1 :  Summary of Types of Businesses in Study 
Business Types n 
Flooring and Carpeting 9 




Door and Glass Installation 1 
Heavy Machine Operator 1 
Vinyl Siding Installation 1 
Architecture 1 
Table 2: Summary of Number of Employees for Businesses in Study 
Number of Employees 
5 or less employees 
4 or less employees 
3 or less employees 








Twenty-two interviews were conducted face-to-face and three by telephone. 
Interviews were conducted at a time and place convenient for the participant. Seventeen 
interviews took place in participants' homes and during evening hours. Three interviews 
were held at job sites while participants were working and two were conducted at local 
restaurants. While interviews varied in length, none lasted more than two hours. Most 
averaged forty-five minutes . 
.An interview guide was used to ensure uniform coverage of topics. Interviews 
opened with questions about family background, marital history, education and training, 
and work history. Participants were then asked questions about their business history 
such as what type of business they operated, how they learned aspects of their business, 
the length of time they had been in business, the types of customers they serviced, the 
types of payments they received and the number and types of persons they employed. 
The core of the interviews focused on specific bookkeeping and taxpaying behaviors and 
the motivations driving such behaviors. Interviews concluded with inquiry into 
reg�latory compliance. The interview questions were refined as necessary throughout the 
research process. For example, initial inquiries into regulatory compliance centered 
entirely around compliance with Occupational and Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) requirements. Many participants were unfamiliar with the guidelines or stated 
that their work did not fall under OSHA requirements. Other regulatory requirements 
such as fire codes, workman's compensation, licensing and permits were, however, often 
discussed during interviews. Subsequently, other regulatory requirements were added 
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during questioning. A copy of the final interview guide is provided in Appendix A. 
Data Analysis 
Twenty-three of the interviews were tape-recorded. Two participants requested 
that their interviews not be tape-recorded but they gave permission for the researcher to 
take notes during the interviews. Audio-taping was preferred to ensure a precise record 
of questions and responses. Participants who agreed to audio-taping of their interviews 
did so on the premise that anonymity and confidentiality be maintained. They were 
assured that this would be the case and all participants who were interviewed face-to-face 
signed an Informal Consent form to participate in the study. Those who were interviewed 
by phone were read the Informed Consent form and agreed verbally with its provisions. 
The Informed Consent Form is included in Appendix B. 
Interviews were transcribed by the researcher. Keeping with the terms of 
anonymity and confidentiality, all names of the participants and any names said during 
the interview were omitted. Interviews were then analyzed using NUD*IST 
(Nonnumerical Unstructured Data by Indexing, Searching and Theorizing) Vivo (Nvivo), 
a computer program for analyzing text-based data (Richards, 1999). Nvivo allows the 
researcher to code, recode and store ideas, concepts, categories and themes relevant to the 
qualitative data being analyzed. Databases are created and can systematically be retrieved 
and managed. Additionally, Nvivo offers the ability to maintain information about cases 
by storing attributes. Information can be exported to create spreadsheets and databases. 
This was especially useful for tracking demographic, business and compliance 
characteristics and creating databases. 
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During data analysis, a systematic coding strategy developed. First, the study 
examined two areas of government regulation for small building and construction firms: 
taxation and regulatory rules. Categories specific to each were created. For taxation, 
categories included filing a tax return, reporting income, reporting employee income and 
claiming deductions. Categories for regulatory rules consisted of OSHA requirements, 
building and fire codes, workman' s  compensation, licensing and permits . Under each of 
these categories, subcategories were created as necessary. For instance, under filing a tax 
return, a subcategory included whether a tax statement was estimated quarterly or 
annually or if a return was filed every year. Next, compliance levels were constructed 
and subcategories were coded as appropriate. While there was considerable variation in 
taxpaying behaviors and levels of compliance, at a broad level it was possible to 
distinguish different types of behaviors and compliance levels . Last, statements 
pertaining to behaviors and compliance were noted, highlighted and coded as necessary. 
The next three sections describes the findings of analysis. The final section concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations and theoretical and policy implications of the study. 
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Statistics from the IRS show that taxpayers who are subject to withholding report 
and pay in a timely manner 97% of the taxes due on their income (Internal Revenue 
Service, 1994). This is in contrast to a voluntary compliance rate of 78% for individuals 
who are not subject to withholding (Internal Revenue Service, 1 994 ). Noble (2000) 
suggests this variance in compliance rates may be explained by the different roles adopted 
by these two groups of taxpayers. Noble (2000) distinguishes these roles as "passive" 
and "active" respectively. 
Regular wage earners or passive taxpayers typically give little thought to 
taxpaying throughout the year. Taxes are considered inevitable; appropriate taxes are 
withheld from each paycheck and submitted to tax authorities by the employer. Regular 
wage earners do not have access to earnings withheld for taxes and base their personal 
budgets on net income. When the time comes to file an annual tax statement, employers 
provide a W-2 form summarizing total pay and the amount of taxes withheld for the year. 
Wage earners file statements after the end of the year based on information from the W-2 
form and on standard allowable deductions such as the number of dependents. Unless 
wage earners itemize deductions beyond those allowed by the government, minimal 
records are required. Often times, wage earners anticipate a refund and look forward to 
filing their tax statement . 
By contrast, small business owners are active taxpayers. They are charged with 
collecting and paying taxes as they earn income and reporting monies paid to employees 
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and/or subcontractors. In order to comply with tax requirements, they must at a bare 
minimum have a system in place to record business income, expenses and payments to 
others. From these records, they are responsible for estimating and paying taxes for 
income on a quarterly basis. At the end of the year, they file a tax statement calculating 
the actual amount of tax owed for the year based on reported income and allowable 
itemized deductions. If taxes have been overestimated and paid quarterly, the owner is 
entitled to a refund. If taxes have been underestimated, the balance must be paid by the 
taxpaying deadline. Additionally, penalties are incurred if the owner fails to file and pay 
an estimate of taxes on quarterly earnings when the taxes owed exceed $1000 for the 
year. Penalties and interest are assessed for any taxes not paid by the annual filing 
deadline. Owners are also required to withhold and submit payroll taxes for employees 
and to report monies exceeding $600 that are paid to others performing services for the 
business. The W-2 form is provided to employees and the 1099 form is provided to 
subcontractors at the end of the year. The 1099 summarizes payments to each 
independent contractor or subcontractor. 
The relevance of the differing roles in taxpaying between regular wage earners 
and owners of small businesses is found in the distribution of opportunities for tax 
noncompliance. Shover and Wright (200 1 :  96) define opportunities as "arrangements or 
situations that offer attractive potential for criminal reward, largely because they are 
accompanied by little apparent risk of detection or penalty." For wage earners, the 
reporting of income and withholding of taxes by employers decreases their opportunities 
for noncompliance. That is, the risk of detection becomes more likely because 
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noncompliance is more "visible" to authorities by virtue of the documents and 
information submitted by employers (Kagan, 1989). By contrast, for small business 
owners, a considerable amount of income may be "invisible" to authorities because of the 
lack of documents and information from third parties (Kagan, 1989). In other words, 
detection by authorities comes only with a greater amount of effort and resources that are 
typically not available. 
This chapter identifies five primary behaviors that the owners of small building 
and construction firms in this study use in response to the increased opportunities for 
noncompliance with taxpaying requirements: failing to file an annual tax statement; 
failing to report all business income; maximizing deductions; falsifying business records; 
and overpaying taxes. The specific behaviors are detailed separately along with the 
frequency of each behavior and the profiles of the businesses and owners employing each 
behavior. It is should be noted that the taxpaying behaviors are not fixed or mutually 
exclusive and participants may fall into more than one category. 
Failing to File an Annual Tax Statement 
Failing to file an annual tax statement was the second most common taxpaying 
behavior identified among the owners of small building and construction firms in the 
study. Five of the participants admitted never filing taxes and one ceased filing for the 
past two years. Three other participants reported previous periods of failing to file a tax 
statement. Characteristic of owners in the study not filing annual tax returns was their 
lack of personal responsibilities and commitments. None were married, had children, 
owned a home, or maintained a line of credit while not filing a tax return. Most described 
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a lifestyle considered less than conventional by society's standards with a penchant 
toward "partying" and little concern for or obligation to anyone including tax authorities. 
Back in the early days when I was making good money and spending good 
money, you know on drugs and partying, I just didn't pay my taxes. I was 
just having a good time. 
Along with a lack of personal responsibilities, many spoke of enjoying freedom 
from authority and a structured work situation. 
I couldn't work for no one else. After awhile, I got so used to it, 
everything I wanted to do [I did] the way I wanted. 
I'll tell you what. One time, actually I went to work for [company name] 
and I worked there for about two weeks on the second shift and I went in 
one night and that's when Tennessee and Vanderbilt were the two best 
basketball teams in the country and they were playing on TV that night and 
I wanted to watch that game. And the more I thought about it, the more I 
wanted to watch it. So I just went over there and clocked out and the 
foreman told me, "What's the matter?" And I told him, "I am going home 
to watch that ballgame." He said, "Well, you can' t do that. You do 
something like that and I'll have to fire you." I said, "No you don't. I 
quit." I went to the bar and watched the ballgame. 
Typically, the dislike for structure transferred into their business style. 
Participants failing to file tax statements kept poorly organized business records, if any at 
all. For instance, during one interview on a job site, a participant wanted to show me the 
invoice book used to keep records and had difficulty locating its whereabouts. Upon 
finally locating the book, the participant found in it a previously misplaced $300 check 
and stated, "I guess not many people lose checks like this." 
Additionally, these participants were unable and not interested in expanding their 
business. Usually they were restricted to accepting residential jobs that paid cash or 
personal checks and work contracts in semi-rural to rural areas where work tends to be 
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less formal. As one participant who had formerly not filed a tax statement conveyed: 
You know there is a downside though. I mean you can only go so far if 
you're going to have a reputation other than you do good work. But if 
you 're working strictly cash these days, a lot of people aren' t going to 
work you because they want to claim what they 're having done. 
While a substantial proportion of participants that had not filed annual tax 
statements spoke of working mainly for cash income, they also, at times, accepted checks 
from companies for contract and subcontract jobs and received 1099 forms from the 
companies. All denied detection by tax authorities even though the pay was documented 
and reported to the government. Several participants discussed that they had at some 
point a fear of authorities catching up with them but resolving their trepidation as time 
went on without consequence. 
PI: When you talk about the fear of consequence, is it something that 
hangs over you? 
SUBJECT: It did the first three years that I got clean [from drug 
addiction] . 
PI: How have you gone about resolving that fear? 
SUBJECT: Well, it just didn't bother me that much. You know one time 
I moved to Georgia for about three months and worked and got a little 
1099 from somebody for about six grand and they [tax authorities] came 
knocking on [former employer's] door looking for me in Georgia. But not 
here. All these years. And I was gone and he told them I had moved to 
Montana. They've never bothered me. 
PI: But other contractors send in 1099's too? 
SUBJECT: Yeah, they sent one for about $25,000 on me one year. Never 
heard a word from them [IRS] .  They don't do a very good job. 
Several alluded that the "trick" was to remain anonymous with authorities by not 
filing an annual tax return. One participant reported being told the same by an IRS 
worker. 
I had one cool IRS worker who told me the same thing they did 
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[describing others who remained anonymous with tax authorities]. If you 
just ignore them and you don't file anymore and you lose touch with them 
then they just lose track of you. It seems the ones who do file and try to 
work it out are the ones who have constant problems with them [the IRS]. 
Participants who became compliant after a period of noncompliance found this 
last statement to be true. 
I had gotten down about twenty-five thousand dollars [in back taxes]. 
When I finally got straightened back up and started doing the right thing, 
living better, I just went in and set up payments with them and I paid 
payments on it for three or four years . . . They did put some liens on 
things. Two years ago, I went and borrowed twenty thousand dollars and 
just paid it off . . .  It was the liens and it was hard just trying to buy even 
menial things. I mean it is on your record. You can't have anything. I tell 
you gotta have credit and good credit to live alright . . .  I mean they were 
adding interest and penalties. They didn't care. It took me two or three 
years to get straightened out but I paid my bills. 
They write you a letter telling you they are going to start looking into your 
assets. I mean, "We are going to start checking into your assets, boy!" 
Basically, that's what it says . . .  It's like I had an $8000 note from '93 and 
it's got off after about six years. It was about $12,000. That's a pretty 
good lick. 
Ironically, though, while the owners who had never filed a tax statement were not 
receiving official sanctions, their personal and business lifestyles were not without 
consequence. They had little to show in the way of fruits of their labor as the years 
progressed. As the oldest noncompliant participant reflected: 
I worked all these years and never saved a penny but I had a good time 
spending it. I had such a good time, that's why I'm now waiting on a liver 
transplant. 
Failini: to Report All Business Income 
Failing to report business income on the tax statement was the most common 
taxpaying behavior among owners of small building and construction firms in the study. 
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Fourteen of the nineteen owners who filed tax returns admitted that they had to some 
degree not reported income to tax authorities. The income varied in the types and 
amounts that went unreported and was concealed through side jobs, side businesses and 
cash payments. 
Side Jobs 
Side jobs refer to the work that owners take on outside their typical business 
schedule. Three of the owners admitted taking side jobs for extra money. They 
considered money earned from side jobs apart from regular business income. 
Subject: When I do a little side job then people just usually give me 
money. 
PI: You said, "A side job." What do you consider a side job? 
Subject: Well, it's when I don' t do it for a company but for an individual 
who calls me and wants me to do something. If it's somebody you know. 
I mean if they write me a personal check and don't ask for no social 
security number then it's cash on the side. 
For one owner, side jobs were used to barter for services from other businesses for 
personal use. "Most of the time it is for trades and stuff. Like, I will trade with a guy for 
some insulation work or things like that." 
Typically, income from side jobs was viewed as spending money to be used for 
enjoyment and recreation. 
If you have cash in your pocket then you are going to spend it not 
necessarily for equipment or maintenance or work costs . . . it's just for 
extracurricular activities. You might want to go buy something you don't 
normally have the money for, you know. 
Side jobs were infrequent for most of the owners in the study because many 
worked extended hours including nights and weekends just to maintain their businesses. 
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Side Businesses 
Side businesses differ from side jobs. The owners working side jobs did so as an 
extension of their business. The owners of side businesses operated their businesses in 
addition to being employed in the conventional economy. They reported high compliance 
when paying tax on income from their conventional jobs but admitted not reporting the 
income earned from their side businesses. 
Three participants in the study operated side businesses. They shared several 
characteristics. They were not married, did not have children, and did not own their 
home. It should be noted, however, that while they were single without families, they 
alluded to many others operating side businesses who were married with families. One 
owner worked at a professional job and conducted his side business at night and on 
weekends. Two of the owners worked as union laborers and operated their businesses 
primarily when laid off and collecting unemployment benefits. 
For the owner who worked a full time professional job, the side business was 
considered an entrepreneurial effort to be rewarded and capitalized upon. 
Employment' s different than doing some work. If I was in this full time, I 
would have to think about that [paying taxes] . . . doing the side work I 
never see myself as part of the whole system . . .  with the side stuff, I say 
that money is mine. 
For the other two owners, the side businesses were viewed as a lucrative 
continuation of their union job. 
[The company] puts the guys on unemployment for the wintertime. They 
lay them off. We're a union company. So, I don't know if you've heard 
this before, but once you get so many hours in for the year with the union 









then your personal benefits are paid for one year. So if you only work six 
months, you're still covered for the whole year. So around December or 
January, they lay everyone off and if you have a side business then you can 
get cash while you collect unemployment. And that's  all cash money and 
that's  the same money you make normally before the taxes come out. So 
you gotta love that. 
The owners that operated side businesses appeared the most calculating of all 
participants interviewed. They described well thought out schemes to avoid detection and 
to ensure earnings were not taxed. For example: 
Most [jobs] are at the lower end, like residential. The commercial is the 
one you have concern with. I talk to the big jobs or the commercial like, 
"How is that going to look on your books." I make sure to ask about that. 
I say, "How do you guys put that on your books." I usually know the 
person so I ask them to put it under [name] Enterprises in their book and 
then make the check out to me personally. That way if they [tax 
authorities] look at the books, I am nowhere to be found. It is just another 
business gone. Now if they looked at the checks then that's another thing. 
But they usually look at the books and that's not going to be of concern. If 
it came down to it and they pulled checks, then something might happen . .  
. I hold onto the paperwork for a couple of years in case it ever came back 
up. And I overcharged the materials and kept the receipts but I returned a 
lot of the stuff and I had paid cash to the workers I had so I could also 
claim more on it. They couldn' t  track that way how much I really paid 
out. If it came down to it, I could show them that I really didn' t  really 
make that much off of it. 
While owners of side businesses constituted a small proportion of the sample, 
participants suggested many construction workers operate these types of businesses. As 
one of these participants stated, "It's like a little network out there." 
Cash Payments 
Eleven owners in the study admitted that they had not stated cash payments from 
regular business transactions on their income tax returns. Personal characteristics varied 
among the eleven owners; they did not have specific attributes in common. For instance, 
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they were married and divorced, homeowners and renters, and some had children. 
Business characteristics also differed such as by trade and the number of employees. 
While all admitted they had not reported cash payments on their tax statement, the 
significant majority denied doing so regularly or for large amounts of income. The 
largest amounts of cash not reported annually were estimated at 20% and 40% of total 
earnings respectively by two owners. Other owners stated that the amounts they failed to 
claim was a much smaller percentage of their earnings. Several respondents reported 
limiting the amount of cash that they did not report. 
I tried to keep as proper as can be on [cash jobs] most of the time. I mean 
I tum in usually anything over $100. If it was under that or tips, I usually 
don't  keep up with it. You know the piddly things . 
Many stated that cash jobs often were not available for the level of business they 
were interested in conducting. 
PI: Let me ask you, how do people usually pay you, checks or cash? 
Subject: It' s  with checks. The ones you are going to make any money on 
nine times out of ten . . .  are going to pay you checks. 
We are getting more jobs where people are paying us in checks . Like for 
the past nine years, our jobs were usually with people that had money and 
would just pay in cash. Now we are getting some advertising rather than 
just word of mouth referrals and those kind of folks have more of a 
tendency to want to pay with a check so they can claim it back. You know 
I' ve always found it unusual that people would pay us in cash and not have 
any records of us being on the job. 
Normally so I do take some cash jobs but I rarely claim them 'cause I 
don't take that many. They're not traceable. It' s  usually the little jobs like 
a $200 or $300 cash job. Anything above that is usually in check anyway. 
Many admitted that cash transactions were attractive due to invisibility to tax 
authorities . One owner summarized the point well : 




They can't prove nothing. I don' t  have no record of it. The people that 
give it to me have no record of it. They got to prove that I done [the job] 
and had [the cash] and spent it. It's hard to explain without paper to back 
it up. 
Despite the lucrativeness of cash payments, it appeared more important for these 
owners to report the significant majority of their income for credit purposes and to avoid 
detection. 
Subject: It catches up with you in the future especially if you decide, 
"Well, I think I will get married and have some kids." 
Spouse: Especially when you want to get a mortgage. If you don't claim 
your income, it kind of catches up with you. You have to show your tax 
returns to get anything. 
I figure the government can only come after me on what they can prove. 
That would be the only way is by what I show through the bank and the 
bills I spend like, you know, car payment, house payment, things like that. 
That's real obvious as to how much money I made. 
Maximizing Deductions 
Maximizing deductions was another common taxpaying behavior found among 
participants in the study. The behavior of maximizing deductions refers to claiming as 
many business and personal expenses as possible in order to minimize the tax burden. By 
maximizing deductions, business owners often push the limits of legitimacy. As one 
participant stated, "I mean if I could get away with deducting the dog I would." 
Eight of the participants in the study described maximizing deductions as a 
taxpaying behavior. While participants who do not file a tax statement were 
characterized by a lack of responsibility in their lifestyle and business style, the opposite 
was found for participants maximizing deductions. Six were married and two had been 
married and all owned their own home. Six of the eight had dependent children. As a 
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group in comparison with other participants in the study, they tended to work more 
regular hours, to accept more jobs for formal customers and businesses, maintain 
organized business records, and use accountants to file their tax statements. 
Although similar in many characteristics, I identified two distinct groups of 
owners that maximize deductions: professional and non-professional. Professional 
owners of small building and construction firms had a place of business separate from 
their home, a bookkeeper or elaborate bookkeeping system, and stable, full-time 
employees. Additionally, they had their businesses set up as a corporations and more 
aggressively sought tax relief through deductions. Non-professional owners operated 
their business from their home, kept their own books or kept them with the assistance of a 
spouse when married, did not typically keep regular/full-time employees, and filed their 
business taxes as a sole proprietorship or as self-employed. 
Professional Owners: Maximizing Deductions 
Two participants were identified as professional business owners maximizing 
deductions. Both of these participants operated their businesses from an office with 
fulltime/regular employees who carried out the majority of labor tasks. The professional 
owners typically worked 40 hour work weeks and focused on running the business. Both 
reported investing the time and energy to become knowledgeable in ways to ensure 
business and financial success . 
. . . learning how to do it the first go around, I made terrible mistakes. I 
mean it was trial and error. I mean in school, they never taught us 
anything about business. There were no business courses. I learned more 
in high school general business than anything in college. I mean the first 




first year when I took everything in for the tax return and they said you 
made this much money and you have to send this much money to the IRS, 
I couldn't believe it. I didn't know anything. I mean money for taxes, 
money for social security. I mean finding out things along that line. This 
go around here, I shopped. I have a program that takes care of everything 
all of the time . . .  It used to be trial and error and now I know what I was 
going into and prepared for it. So I stay up with everything everyday . . .  I 
have done quite a bit of research, done a number of things. I think a lot of 
people get scared of learning to do new things or don't know how to begin. 
I am always looking into different ways to do things, to make my business 
operate better. 
I was an idiot in the beginning being a sole proprietorship and not a 
corporation and the way I paid taxes at first. I mean I paid like $22,000 a 
year in taxes and it was unbelievable . . .  I did that for five or six years . . .  
Then I met a guy [accountant] at a concert . . .  and he said, "You are a 
fucking fool. You got to get incorporated. You are paying a fortune." 
And I had been paying all that in taxes and let him do my taxes the next 
year and I got $5000 back. I said, " . . .  this the greatest thing I have ever 
seen . . .  " He carried me as an employee and he filed my taxes separate 
from the corporation . . .  I probably have saved hundreds of thousands for 
myself in having the business as a corporation. Like five or six years of 
self-employment taxes at twenty to thirty-eight thousand a year. We are 
talking major that I have saved . . .  It takes $100 to become a corporation. I 
thought it was this long drawn out $5000 attorney deal. . .  I really felt like 
it was a big drawn out deal and so hard to do like it was going to be 
expensive and so hard to do and all this worries about it. I didn' t know 
anything about it. 
Both of these owners had incorporated their business. By incorporating their 
businesses, they shielded themselves from personal liabilities for the businesses' losses 
and risks and capitalized on tax advantages. Corporations are taxed as an entity separate 
from the individuals comprising them. The income of the business owner was paid by the 
corporation and subject only to personal income tax. 
I don't have to pay taxes for the business because I pay myself as an 
employee and then just get a W-2 and file regularly . . .  We have [business 
income] where all of it accumulates and then at the end of the year we, the 
holders, have a total sum that we can take or roll over to the next year. 
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[The accountant] started carrying me as an employee and he filed my taxes 
separate from the corporation . . .  and the corporation was always broke at 
tax time. I took corporate funds at the end and it was perfectly legal and 
paid payroll taxes to myself on it you know and then I 'd let the company 
pay that . .  I let the company pay my personal taxes too. I just have them 
write another check and take it off for payroll the next year. 
Both business owners reported comprehensive bookkeeping methods for tax 
purposes; they recorded all business income, estimated and paid taxes in a timely manner, 
reported all employee income and paid payroll taxes. Both used the services of an 
accountant to advise them and prepare tax statements. 
I have someone to do that for me. We take everything to her and she takes 
care of filing everything. She seems to be able to show us the best way to 
file things. Everything is legitimate but she just knows how to do it the 
best for us. I mean there are things like even what type of car you should 
drive to get the best break. We do everything by the books though. 
This owner expressed resolution and confidence in the interview that he and the 
accountant maximized deductions aggressively but did so legitimately. The other owner 
was also forthcoming in reporting the importance of having an accountant that would 
aggressively minimize tax costs. However, this owner was more tentative in contending 
all behaviors were above board even though he claimed high tax compliance. Excerpts 
from the interview describing experiences with accountants illustrate the point. 
My dumb ass paid $18,000 last year from [accountant's name] because the 
crazy woman put down everything I gave her. Whatever I gave her is what 
she put down on paper and I wanted to make sure my mom [ who is the 
bookkeeper for the business] felt comfortable with the person we go to and 
she never felt comfortable with [the former accountant]. She agrees he 
was a good thing but she never liked his tactics . . . And so I got away 
from him and went to [above-mentioned accountant] and she did the same 
thing to us for a couple of years and I said I have got to change this. There 
is no reason in the world why we should be paying taxes. Sure enough I 
went to a new accountant and I told him I do not want to pay any taxes. I 
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said I don't want to get any back, I just don't want to pay anything. And 
he said, "We'll see what we can do . . .  " She wasn't utilizing the whole tax 
system . . .  She wasn't counseling us and coming in and saying you can do 
this different and you've done too much in this area. Like, "Why don't 
you take a bonus for the next couple of months and let this balance out." 
She didn't watch my books, she just added it up. Good accounting is 
crucial. It makes so much of a difference. 
I have cheated a lot when I was with [first accountant] . Well, not really 
cheating but his theory was take it and if there is any argument we can 
fight it. So anything we were able to take even that would remotely relate 
to us we would take it. He was smart enough even though a little 
unconventional at times but superintelligent and he always had a plan and 
took notes on everything we did so we could remember what was going on 
. . . He goes to a lot of tax and IRS seminars. He is up that way and he 
goes to DC and the IRS teaches everybody how to win everytime and he is 
always there. He knows the IRS inside and out and he makes it his duty to 
learn . . .  He is just really into beating the IRS. Well, not really beating 
them but just playing their game the way they tell him to play. We keep it 
totally legal and keep explanations of why we did the way we do. I mean 
it's the way they say it can be done and we do it. 
Non-Professional Business Owners: Maximizing Deductions 
Six participants were identified as non-professional owners maximizing 
deductions. Their taxpaying behaviors differed in several ways from professional owners 
maximizing deductions. Non-professional owners filed their tax statements as sole 
proprietors or as self-employed. As sole proprietors, all income from their businesses 
were filed on their personal tax statements in the year the income was earned and was 
subject to both income and self-employment taxes. According to the participants, their 
taxes constituted 25%-30% of their income. While all admitted not reporting some 
income, they claimed that they reported the majority of the earnings and used deductions 
to reduce their tax burden. As one owner summarized, "It just makes more business 
sense to deposit [income] in the bank and pay your bills and take your deductions." 
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Also unlike their professional counterparts, the non-professional owners were 
limited in the time they could devote to developing business management and taxpaying 
skills. They spent most of their time laboring on jobsites; business tasks often took a 
backseat to the jobs at hand. Time constraints played a significant role in the way the 
non-professional business owners went about utilizing the tax system to their benefit. For 
instance, only one of the six participants completed payroll tasks and issued W-2 forms. 
The other participants paid employees as independent subcontractors and submitted 1099 
forms and they employed workers irregularly. These behaviors allowed the owners to 
minimize paperwork but deduct worker's earnings. One owner and spouse described how 
they go about this behavior. 
Husband: I start them [employees] out at 6 [dollars] an hour and then if 
they stay around I'd push them up to about 9 [dollars an hour] eventually 
and then they were responsible for claiming it because it helps me out . . .  
[to spouse] What is that she [accountant] calls it when you pay so many 
people up to so much money and we don't have to send nothing on them? 
Wife: Contract labor. 
PI: How much can you claim on them? 
Wife: You can go up to $900 per person for six people . . .  We can claim 
them without having to do the paperwork on them. That helps a lot. 
Another example of owners taking time constraints into account included the 
decision to pay penalties rather than estimate taxes quarterly. Four of the six owners 
failed to estimate their taxes quarterly. They reasoned that the penalty was minimal in 
comparison with the time saved or that the penalty was offset by deductions. 
Yeah, I just file at the end of the year and there is a penalty involved but it 
is not that big of deal. 
We should do it quarterly but we do it once a year. It just is easier to do it 
once a year. 
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PI: Do you pay quarterly or do you pay the penalty for once a year? 
Spouse: Honestly, we've never really had to pay the penalty. Because the 
child care thing . . . Because we file jointly on our taxes, what I pay in 
covers a portion of his taxes. With all the deductions, you know once you 
claim all the deductions. 
The last quote represents a common impression by most of these participants. 
That is, if they do not have to send money at the end of the year regardless of what has 
already been paid in taxes or penalties, such as in the case of taxes being withheld from 
the spouse's payroll, then they are not paying taxes. Thus, reducing the bottom line on 
their tax statements through deductions became an overreaching goal. 
I keep every receipt and try to get every deduction I can . . .  I go to dinner 
and talk about business and keep the receipt. Every chance, I try to write 
off. 
You would be surprised. We keep every receipt you can imagine .. . .  even 
my cable because I got to watch the weather for my business 
[landscaping]. 
In finding ways to maximize deductions, the services of a tax accountant or 
preparer recurred as a primary theme. Although the non-professional owners only visited 
the "tax person" on a yearly basis, securing a "good accountant" was no less important 
than for the professional owner. 
Subject: A good accountant makes a big difference. 
PI: So a good accountant makes a difference you think? 
Subject: Well, it does . . . I mean he helps me take care of everything legal 
and like that but also to take what [deductions] I can. 
Spouse: The accountant knows how to do it all. 
Subject: She is creative. 
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Well we changed [accountants] . . .  [previous accountant] was getting old 
and not keeping up and [new accountant] seems to be up with things. I 
mean the tax laws are always changing. [New accountant] seems to be 
more thorough and asks more questions and seems to look for what we 
could take and stuff. [New accountant] looks for the deductions. You 
gotta have someone who hunts for things. 
Searching for deductions was one of the most common characteristics owners 
were looking for in a qualified accountant. Another characteristic was alerting owners to 
"flags." 
[Accountant] knows what we need to watch for. If she sees we have been 
doing something, she tells us we need to stop doing that . . . Well, like she 
tells us, "better not put that down because the IRS sees flags when things 
change." 
[Accountant] tells me when something red flags and I have to watch out because 
[accountant] knows I'm not perfect and not always totally accurate . . . So we just 
estimate and make it work out close to the last year. 
It is interesting to note that while this last statement points to impropriety, the 
owner considered himself to be a rather compliant taxpayer as did most of the owners 
maximizing deductions. For the owners in the study, maximizing deductions was 
perceived a good business behavior regardless of pushing the limits. 
I mean the system will work for you. You buy equipment, you buy a 
truck, your socks. You get to deduct everything from the socks down on 
your feet. I do anyway. I mean it works for you if you work it. 
Falsifying Business Records 
Falsifying business records was a lesser common taxpaying behavior among 
owners in the study. Falsifying records was typically used to compensate for 
disorganization in bookkeeping or to minimize owed taxes. Five participants in the study 
described falsifying business records as a primary behavior when preparing their tax 
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statement. 
In examining characteristics of these owners, most appeared to be attempting to 
make ends meet in their business and personal lives. Four of the participants were 
married and one was divorced. Four had children under the age of ten years and one had 
no children. Three owned modest homes while the other two rented their places of 
residence. Three spouses held part-time jobs and one also attended college part-time. The 
spouses of the married owners assisted in the business to varying degrees and managed 
business tasks. The business was often a source of stress in family life. 
I mean the business consumes so much of our time . . .  you know it's like 
your marriage almost revolves around the business and you just cannot do 
that when you're raising kids. And it 's not good for us. 
My computer' s  bogged down because I can hardly use it now. It 's so 
overloaded right now. And that desk, there's  not enough room for the 
business and for our family and everything else. It's  that growing thing. 
It 's getting so hard because [the kids], when he finally comes home, they 
want his attention. We' re sitting here trying to go over what bills have 
been paid, what he's written checks for today to pay out for materials, and 
it's like, "What's  that again," because everyone's talking and everyone' s  
tired. I mean it's  like the other night and we were working at midnight on 
a big bill that we had to send to a guy that morning." 
Spouse: We've been able to squeak by. When it gets bad, I call my 
parents. 
Owner: I mean this not a lifestyle for everybody. This is a very up and 
down type of thing. I mean we are able to get ourselves through. I mean 
when one of us is having a tough time then the other has to pick up the 
slack and vice versa. 
Spouse: I am considering going back to work because of the cash flow 
problems. Just for the security. And so we can get health insurance which 
we don't have. To me I find it very stressful. 
References to financial difficulties were typical in interviews with participants 
who were falsifying records. 
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Spouse: We were going to file bankruptcy in December. We had gone to 
Consumer Credit Counseling . . .  and we just couldn't do it so we looked 
at it and we looked and what it entailed and he [subject] said n. 
Subject: You know I just said no because I wasn't going to do it to my 
wife and kids . . .  being by myself, I could get out of it and say the hell 
with it and start back over tomorrow . . .  but it could destroy a marriage and 
everything. It could destroy her. 
We're making it stretch right now. You can get in trouble easy. Once you 
start to get behind in your bills. Like we can easily pay $250 per month in 
late fees alone if it's a bad month . . .  If I can stay on top, I pay a little extra 
on things but then when I have a bad time then it doesn't help to keep 
ahead and you slide right back where you were. 
Yeah, it takes a lot of fenagalling when you have projects. Got a lot of 
income for materials and labor and they're late with partial or full payment 
[for the job] then it makes it very tough to keep up. You have to make up 
for the slack. 
Additionally, the business was the primary source of income for the households 
and many times separating money for the household and money for the business was 
difficult. 
Subject: If I went and did a job and a guy writes me a check for $2000, 
well, I'm going to go down to the bank and cash that $2000 check and I'm 
going to put it wherever. Well, I need $500 to pay this insurance. Well, it 
don' t need to be like that. And what she's been saying is it don't need to 
be like that. I don't like it. If I need money, if I need $ 100 to get fuel, I 
just get $ 100 instead of taking money out for fuel. Like taking money for 
us. 
Spouse: He don' t take a payday. We work off what we're making. 
Everything goes in the pile. Whatever. We take everything out of the pile, 
the bills, the groceries. 
Descriptions of their taxpaying behaviors often paralleled their descriptions of 
their financial problems and record keeping. Terminology such as "fenagling," 
"knocking out the bottom line" and "thinking creatively" were recurrent as participants 
discussed dealing with tax records and finances. Following are some examples of the 
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behaviors that these owners and their spouses used to make ends meet in their taxpaying. 
Spouse: So when it comes to filing our taxes I try everything I can to 
knock out our bottom line--to not have to pay them so much at the end of 
the year. 
PI: So how do you knock it out? 
Spouse: Well, I mean, a lot of it is legitimate. Where we pay and I 
shouldn' t  do this but . . .  where he has paid people who help him on jobs 
or you know when he split the money with another contractor, I don't ever 
put that in as independent contractors or subcontractors. I run it under 
materials. It doesn 't mess the other person up and it saves me having to 
work having to file all these 1099's. I don 't have time to do it. So you try 
to think creatively. Say we go buy tires. You know we are going to try to 
make sure that's on something we are using for work. 
Lots of times I try to get the customers to write multiple checks [to the 
owner and employees] . . .  most of our clients know we are trying to get the 
best for them and not cheat them then they work with us. Like if they 
don't mind then we try to get them to write checks out to all of us that 
way. 
Spouse: [Relative] is our accountant and I just print out everything under 
the sun and let him have it. He knows how to operate without throwing up 
the red flags. He tells me where I can put things that will fly and I just 
defer things to wherever he thinks is best. 
PI: I heard someone else call it "creative paperwork." Have ya' ll heard 
that term? 
Subject: We made it up. 
Spouse: No. We do that but I have not heard it called that. 
Subject: We will dump a lot of cash and expenses into inventory, 
maintenance. 
Spouse: Like [accountant] will play with the numbers . . .  I don ' t  feel 
good about not being honest but it 's just unfortunately part of it . I just 
don't know otherwise how we can do it. 
PI: What do you do when [accountant] says there are red flags? 
Subject: We just change it. We shift it around and just change it, you 
know. 
Throughout the interviews with owners and spouses who were falsifying records, 
many were cognizant that their behaviors were illegitimate and most discussed having 
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plans to change their situation. 
Subject: We're on the verge of setting up an office. We're in the process. 
I've got a trailer and I'm fixing to build a garage for my equipment. I'm 
going to put it [the office] right beside the shop and she's going to go daily 
at least a couple of hours of the morning or the night or whatever . . .  The 
business is picking up. I mean if it's going to be run right. 
Spouse: It's time. It's no longer a hobby. It's become a job. And that's 
how you have to start out. 
So we need to shoot for incorporating . . . because if we go down it's not 
just the business going down which is really what is happening it would be 
everything. And that's not a lot of fun to think about. 
I am trying to change jobs. I want completely out of the building business. 
Pretty much I want to get a regular job. You know, working steady forty 
to sixty hours a week . . .  it's not nearly as much independence if I do that 
though . . .  but then I won't have to worry about getting the calls and 
paying the bills. 
Overpayine Taxes 
Overpaying was the least common taxpaying behavior found among participants 
in the study. Overpaying resulted from paying more tax than owed by reporting all 
income and underclaiming deductions. Three participants in the study described 
overpaying as their primary taxpaying behavior. 
In common, the three (?Wners who overpaid taxes were married and had dependent 
children in the home. Two of them owned their home and one rented. Spouses of all 
three worked in the conventional economy; they were employed full time and received 
regular paychecks and benefits from their employers. These owners espoused traditional 
lifestyles for the most part by participating in school and recreational activities with their 
children and for two attending church weekly. One owner discussed recovering from 
alcoholism and being actively involved in a twelve step program. All three owners 
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reported a strong work ethic and satisfaction in their work. 
Two of the participants had been employed by large companies prior to entering 
business for themselves. They described their business successfully developing from a 
side business while laid off from previous employment. 
When I got laid off the last time at [company], just gosh, probably word of 
mouth got around church and then I ran an add in the paper, stuff like that 
and it happened. Up until a year or so ago, I never turned a job down. Just 
whatever somebody wanted done, if l couldn't do it, I'd find a way to get it 
done. 
I was laid off for about six months from [company]. I just couldn't sit 
around so I started doing jobs for people and word got around . . .  I began 
making decent money . . .  I liked being able to get a job done right . . .  
When they called me back to work, we sat down and decided I could make 
a go of this and I have. 
The other participant learned the trade by working for another small business 
owner and, upon discovering the profits that could be earned, branched out 
independent! y. 
Well, I tell you, when I worked with [name], [they] showed me one time 
how much [they] were making and I was working for them at seven dollars 
an hour. Well, I tell you what, I just really started paying attention and I 
thought, "You know, I could do this on my own." It was true too. I mean 
I have done real good for us doing this. 
While all three owners spoke with pride about the financial rewards of their work, 
it was just that--the rewards of their work. That is, none of the three owners displayed an 
interest in gaining financial success through means other than their labor. Business tasks 
were kept to a minimum. For example, all three described simply keeping records 
through their checkbook. One owner described the bookkeeping process. 
PI: How do you keep your books? 
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Subject: Just do what has to be done. Whatever. You mean bookkeeping 
as in? 
PI: Like people pay you and then you have to record it and keep up with it 
and your expenses and all that. 
Subject: I just go through my checking account. Whatever people pay me 
goes in my checking account and whatever I pay out comes out of my 
checking account. 
Pl: Do you keep a separate checking account or do you use your personal 
checking account? 
Subject: Keep it in the same one. I used to have two checking accounts 
back when I was with [company] . [Wife] had one and I had one. It just 
gets to be a hassle to keep up with tow and I would have a separate one for 
business but one is always lost. So you need to write a check and, hey, 
you got two checkbooks and one's lost and you just use the one you found. 
So it ' s  just easier to have one . . .  
PI: How do you keep up with employee records? How do you pay people 
that work for you? 
Subject: Out of my personal checking account. I just write them a check. 
I just try to keep everything as simple as I can because it can get too 
complicated. In my checking account, I can just go down through there 
and you know exactly what you made and got. 
All three owners maintained that they deposited all income including cash in their 
checking accounts and reported it on their tax statement. The same was not always true 
for reporting deductions. They typically described keeping poor records of deductions 
and estimating deductions usually to the benefit of the government. 
I just estimate the best I can. I mean I probably cheat myself more than I 
cheat them. I mean there are a lot of deductions I know I'm not giving 
myself that I'm probably eligible for. Like a business portion of my home. 
You know I have a room upstairs with a computer in it for the business. I 
just get way behind . . .  When you come in at night, you have the choice to 
do your bookwork or do work around the house or spend time with the 
family. You put the bookwork off . . .  I mean it works okay. 
None of the three owners were currently using an accountant to prepare their tax 
statement. They had some previous experience in using an accountant but were not 
interested in advice on minimizing their tax burden or in paying someone to simply fill 
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out the forms. 
I went to a tax lady once that someone told me about. I had everything 
listed from the checkbook. She just wanted to complicate it and me to do 
a bunch of stuff I wasn't wanting to keep up with. I just wanted the papers 
filled out and I can do that myself for nothing. 
Sometimes I took it to an accountant. Mostly, I took it to one and they 
charged me. She said, "Oh, it makes it so easy when you have everything 
listed here in order on a sheet of paper." All she had to do was transpose 
off my sheet onto hers. It took her about fifteen minutes. She said, "It just 
makes it so easy with everything listed here. And that will be $280 for 
fifteen minutes." I thought, "Well, wait just a minute. Something is 
wrong with this scenario." So the next year, I just got my form out and I 
transferred it to over where she had them. 
Like the owners who believed they were not paying taxes if they deducted enough 
expenses and did not have to write a check at the end of the year, owners overpaying 
taxes reported "not having to pay that much at the end of the year because their spouses 
paid in." When questioned about the illusion presented, the owners expressed content 
with their tax burden regardless of paying more tax than owed. A statement by one of the 
participants summed up the general attitude of the three: "I don't really mind. If nobody 




One of the most obvious conclusions drawn from the review of the tax 
compliance literature is that we know little about the motivations driving taxpaying 
behaviors. As noted previously, tax compliance research has centered almost exclusively 
around economic benefit and potential loss through punishment as the primary motivation 
for noncompliance. While social scientists have more recently begun to explore other 
variables, an understanding of motivations other than self-interest remains limited. What 
is clear, however, is that one motivation does not stand alone among the others and that 
the motivations underlying taxpaying are complex and dynamic dimensions of human 
behavior. 
The second objective of this study was to explore the motivations driving the 
taxpaying behaviors of the participating owners of small building and construction firms. 
In order to achieve the objective, participants were asked specifically about their 
motivations for compliant and noncompliant behaviors. Many times, motivations became 
apparent through discussions of taxpaying behaviors. Five primary motivational drivers 
were identified in the study: fearing legal consequences; developing/maintaining social 
capital; obtaining business and taxpaying skills; perceiving the tax system as fair or 
unfair; and compensating for long hours and a lack of benefits. 
Fearing Legal Consequences 
The fear of legal consequences operated in several ways to effect compliance and 
noncompliance among owners of small building and construction firms in the study. It 
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was reported by all participants engaged in the tax system as a primary motivation for 
filing an annual tax statement and for reporting the majority of income on the tax 
statement. 
taxes? 
PI: What motivates you to pay taxes? 
Subject: Afraid not to. 
PI: What makes you afraid? 
Subject: I don' t know. I just do it. I mean, what difference does it make 
whether you agree with it or you don't agree with it. You gotta do it 
whether you want to or not. 
PI: What is the main motivation or thing that motivates you to claim money for 
Subject: The fear of getting in trouble. The fines. Having to pay them 
unexpected fees and fines. Them going back and coming with money you 
might owe them. 
While none of the participants referred to the possibility of prosecution or 
imprisonment as a potential consequence they feared, many talked about their fears of tax 
authorities assessing penalties, liens and seizure of assets if noncompliance was detected. 
The government can come in and take what they want and they pretty 
much audit you and I don't want to be stuck with a bill that's you know 
like them saying, "You cheated us for fifty thousand dollars and we want it 
now." I don't like to owe nobody nothing. 
They can threaten to garnish your money or seize your property. I mean I 
have heard of people they have that shit happen to them . . .  I mean they' ll 
take your house and stuff and garnish your money and hit your bank 
accounts . . .  They get you in and they're the government and you can't do 
anything about it. I mean you don't have any recourse with them. 
The government can come in and take what they want and they pretty 
much audit you and I don't want to be stuck with a bill that's, you know, 
like them saying, "You cheated us for fifty thousand dollars and we want it 
now." I don't like owing nobody nothing. 
While the threat of formal consequences steered these participants toward 
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compliance with filing a tax statement and claiming income, this fear also motivated 
many, especially those who had experienced sanctions, to seek out ways to minimize their 
tax burden. Nine owners had at some time experienced sanctions from tax authorities in 
the forms of penalties, interest and liens. Many of these owners considered themselves 
fundamentally compliant and believed they were penalized for what they considered 
errors and/or minor improprieties. The imposition of sanctions often served to embitter 
them toward seeking personal remedy by maximizing deductions. 
I'm not real crazy about Uncle Sam. I mean he can kiss my ass. But 
because of the amount of money we have had to pay, we had to borrow 
fifty thousand dollars because we got so behind on our taxes so I'm not 
real crazy about the whole tax thing. So every chance I can I try to get a 
write-off. I thinks it's so bad . . .  all those penalties and interest and we 
had to pay a lot of money. 
One participant disengaged from the tax system altogether due to mounting 
penalties and interest after years of trying to comply. 
The penalty . . .  and the interest is figured in automatically and the interest 
keeps building. The way they have it set up you just get in deep 'til you 
can't get out . . .  They set you up on this payment schedule and you can pay 
it just like you do your other bills but then it just gets bigger and bigger 
with the interest and you never can get caught up. They just let you get 
screwed and they don't give a shit . . .  I just gave up on them [stopped 
filing a tax statement]. I don't have anything for them to take really right 
now . . .  but I think they have lost track right now. 
Similarly, for participants who failed to file an annual tax statement, a fear of 
consequences often kept them disengaged from the tax system. 
PI: What is the main reason you never paid [taxes]? 
Subject: Well, you know, after I got out of the service in '68, I pretty well 
spent several years where all I did was party. And then you know and I 
kinda slowed down a little bit and thought, "Well, I better file and pay 
these taxes but then no if I do that then they'll catch me for these past 
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years." So I just never did. 
PI: Have you given any thought to eventually beginning to pay your 
taxes? 
Subject: Yeah, sometimes I have but every time I think about it I think 
about how I'm going to explain all this time that I've not paid anything 
and what they' ll do. So I just keep rolling along the way it is . 
Others who had not filed a tax statement reported that they did not have a fear of 
consequences. 
I really don't  worry about it. I mean I don't think . . .  Hell, they won't put 
you in jail. They' ll set up payments for you if you volunteer to pay. 
You' ll just be. It' s  just not that scary or hard. My dad' s been through it. 
They put him up for fifteen thousand dollars and he set up payments and 
sent them a couple of thousand here and there. You know set up 
payments. I mean they want their money. They don't  want to spend 
money to have lawyers and go to court. 
Developinl:{Maintaining Social and Business Capital 
In the past decade, one of the most important contributions to criminological 
theory and research has been the introduction of Sampson and Laub' s  (1993) age-graded 
theory of crime desistance. Their research suggests that building "social capital" reduces 
the likelihood of continued deviance by individuals. The term social capital was 
introduced by Coleman (1988) and refers to the development of positive relationships 
with individuals and institutions that are life-enhancing such as marriage and stable 
employment. According to Sampson and Laub (1993), building social capital supports 
conventional behavior in the same way that building financial capital improves the 
chance for personal success. 
Developing and maintaining social capital has not been examined as a factor in 
tax compliance research. Demographic characteristics and interviews from the current 
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study, however, suggest that developing and maintaining social capital played an 
important role in driving tax compliance among the majority of the participants. 
Demographic characteristics varied between the most and least compliant participants in 
the study. Participants indicating higher levels of compliance with taxpaying tended to 
lead traditional lifestyles and operate more established and organized businesses. They 
were typically married or had been married, had children and owned their home. Their 
businesses allowed them a satisfaction that they were not willing to risk with tax troubles. 
We usually really make about $50,000 a year. I mean that is not too bad. 
We have a good home and do okay. I mean, we have things we never 
would have dreamed of having when we were younger. 
I want to make money to put my daughter through a private school and 
give her the best. That is my main concern. I just want a decent life. I am 
not greedy. If I can be fed, take care of my daughter, have good friends 
and be happy then I am a blessed man. 
Alternatively, owners who failed to file a tax statement tended to be single 
without children, lacked home ownership and a line of credit and led less than 
conventional lifestyles. Additionally, their businesses appeared unorganized and poorly 
structured. The three participants who began filing tax statements and became 
increasingly tax compliant after years of complete tax noncompliance described 
developing a more conventional lifestyle as significant in their transition. For one owner, 
getting married and establishing a home and family motivated compliance. 
Subject: When I met my wife, I wasn't doing, let me take that back, I 
really didn't have to do it [filing a tax statement]. I was single. I didn't 
make an effort to do it, you know. I think that happens to a lot of single 
people . . .  The first year, I had a problem with it [coming into compliance]. 
Spouse: Yeah, you showed you earned sixteen hundred dollars. I said, 




Subject: Responsibility makes it. Growing up and responsibility. Put it 
that way. 
Spouse: Deciding what 's important, what you want. 
PI: Do you have to comply with things to get to that point? 
Spouse: I'm sure there are people out there that say no but I wasn' t  raised 
that way. I think there are probably people who think you can have things 
in life and not have to comply but I think those things catch up with you. I 
don' t  want to take that risk. 
Subject: Yeah, they will catch up with you. I was like that until I met 
[spouse] . I mean really I still feel that way but you know I have to do what 
she says. If I could get my way, I would. 
(Later in the interview.) 
PI: So [subject] , what motivates you to pay taxes? 
Subject: My wife. 
Spouse: He likes to be able to take a loan and buy a piece of equipment 
and he likes to have a truck. You have to be able to borrow money and 
you can' t  borrow money if you don't have anything to show for it, for 
what you've earned. 
For the other two participants who had changed the trajectory of their taxpaying 
history, the decision to desist in a "partying" lifestyle led to their decision to become tax 
compliant. 
I filed one year and then I didn't file nothing until '9 1 .  So that was from 
'79 until '9 1 .  Nothing. And then when I got clean, (describing the ninth 
step process of Narcotics Anonymous) I wrote the IRS a letter and said, 
"Look, I 'm a drug addict and if I owe you any money, I want to know. 
You know, I want to get straight with you." I didn' t  go into large detail . 
When I finally got straightened back up [from cocaine] and started doing 
the right thing, living better, I just went in and set up a payment with them 
and I paid a lot for three or four years. 
Owners in the study who were currently not filing tax statements also talked about 
the effects of their lifestyle on their lack of compliance. Apparent was the lack of 
accountability to others. 
The only person I ever have to answer to is the customer and I do good 
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work for a good price. I set my own hours in getting a job done and even 
then I can make changes if I want . . .  I can go out and party and have a 
good time when I want . . .  I stay my own person. 
For the most noncompliant owners, life changes may at some time sway their 
taxpaying behavior toward a more compliant bend. One of the most noncompliant 
owners in the study is planning to marry soon and discussed thoughts along this line. 
Subject: I think I am going to file this year? 
PI: What has made you thin you are going to this year? 
Subject: I'm getting married and we're buying stuff and even if we 
weren't buying stuff, [fiance] just you know inspired me . . .  Until I got 
engaged, I just never really had to worry about it. It has been kind of hard 
too. [Fiance] shows about $55,000 a year and I show nothing. I am more 
of a liability. 
Obtaining Business and Taxpyaing Skills 
As described earlier, by becoming a business owner participants assumed 
additional tax and business responsibilities that were not present when they were 
employed by others. All of the participants described being unprepared to assume the 
organizational, business management and tax responsibilities required of a business 
owner. As one participant aptly noted, "I drive nails. I don't do books." Most owners in 
the study described learning the necessary business skills through trial and error. 
Trial and error are a big part of it and a lot of errors are made. You just 
get back up and try again. You learn from it. 
You know I was young into it. I didn't know. You know, I guess if I got 
audited now, I'll just say [that] I thought I was doing the right thing. And 
that's the truth. And if l learn otherwise then I'll correct it and use it so I 
don't have to go through it again and hopefully the penalty will not be bad. 
PI: [Spouse], you do most of the books. How did you learn to do it? 
Subject: That first year, she didn't know what she was doing. She was 
trying to screw me over. 
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Spouse: I did not. The first year we did it, I remember I had a room. We 
filed an extension and it was the day we were suppose to go see our tax 
person. I still had a room full of receipts I was looking through. When I 
say a room, I mean it was my upstairs vacated bedroom that was supposed 
to be my office but really looked like my junk pit. And it was strewn with 
receipts. Going through all of them and just trying to organize it to the 
extent of here's what we spent on materials, here is oh yeah, we can use 
this. Here is a gas receipt. You know the first year was a live and let learn 
kind of thing. 
The learning process appeared to be the same for owners of the smallest 
businesses and the owners of the larger incorporated businesses participating in the study. 
The primary difference between the professional owners and the nonprofessional owners 
in the study seemed to center around the resources, time and energy, and capacity to 
develop the necessary business skills. Several nonprofessional owners related that they 
were unable to handle business growth due to these deficits. 
We have had a lot of people working here and a lot of huge jobs constantly 
but it was unmanageable. It's hard to keep quality of work up. To be 
compliant, you have to be bigger and settle for less quality . . . I was just 
trying to maintain things . . . We finally fired everyone and just did it 
ourselves for a little while. 
Basically what I did was, see I took a couple of losses last year. I had too 
many jobs going on at one time. Took a couple of losses. [I] ad a couple 
of customers that bitched, whined and griped, wasn't going to pay. So I 
went back to "it' s  a dog eat world out there" . . .  It' s  a learning process. 
Well, actually the first couple of years I made a lot of money but then I 
started assuming debt after a couple of years and then this year I'm finally 
getting myself straight. Realistically, the best way to do is, you know, [is] 
to stay small or get big and don' t  get in between. And I'm in between . .  . 
If you're real small like I said, you can make a real good living at it . .  . 
You can live like pretty much like everyone else. But this fourth year, I'm 
beaten down to death. 
As mentioned earlier, nine owners had experienced past IRS sanctions and many 
64 
of these owners attributed their noncompliance to errors made because of disorganization, 
uneducated bookkeeping methods and a lack of knowledge. Two owners who never filed 
a tax statement attributed a part of their noncompliance to a lack of the ski lls necessary to 
operate a business. 
This will be the first year that I 'm trying to do the books, keeping all my 
receipts and about once every month or so I dig them out of this console 
thing [in the work van] . It' s  really horrible. I dig them out and put them 
in this folder all crumpled up with cappuccino stains . . .  the ADD 
(Attention Deficit Disorder) just wouldn ' t  allow me to it or organize 
enough . . . Just poor organization. 
Well, that [bookkeeping] is just something I never learned. I don' t  do 
none of that kind of stuff . . .  I just work for a living. 
Perceiving the Tax System as Fair or Unfair 
The perception of fairness, or more accurately the unfairness, of the tax system 
was an issue in the majority of the interviews with participants who filed annual tax 
statements. Most complained that the percentage of taxes owed as self-employed/sole 
proprietors was inflated. The owners claimed consistently that taxes "took" a minimum 
of 25% and a maximum of 35% of their business income. For many of the owners who 
failed to report cash income, maximized deductions and falsified records, perceiving the 
tax system as unfair served as a justification for their noncompliance. 
I mean it' s hard to justify at the end of the month or the end of three 
months. This what we made so now let' s take 25-30% and send it to the 
IRS? 
PI: When you get cash, do you claim it on your taxes? 
Spouse: Not hardly. It ' s  unbelievable what you have to take out of it if 
you do. 
PI: Unbelievable? How much is it? 
Subject: It ' s  33% or 34% . . .  It' s  crazy. I mean we have to pay 30% plus 
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on what we make plus social security plus medicare. I mean they hit you 
for it. We used to get four or five thousand dollars back when he worked a 
regular job. 
PI: What about when you get a cash job and you don't claim it, what 
motivates you not to claim the money? 
Subject: Probably because having to pay so much taxes is the main 
reason. It would be having to pay so much in taxes . I mean we are paying 
so much already that I mean the money is probably going to go to them 
anyway so why give them more. 
The last quote demonstrates a related justification given by several of these 
participants: the income tax system is not the only tax that is unfair but the tax system in 
general is unfair. For instance, one owner explained, "Like I pay taxes for public school 
even though my daughter goes to a private school . You know I don 't think that' s right. It 
(not claiming all income and maximizing deductions) all just works out." Several 
participants talked at length about their thoughts about taxes in general in order to justify 
their noncompliance. The thoughts of one business owner particularly represents the 
typical argument. 
See you're talking about taxes. You bought your car new. You paid taxes 
on that car. When you sell that car why should that person, for instance, 
you sell your car tomorrow to [spouse] . Why should she have to tum 
around and pay tax on that car again. You see. That' s one example. Just 
like my trucks for example. How many times I buy used stuff. How many 
times are you going to have to pay taxes? Everytime you sell it. But why? 
That's what I don't understand. If I have a truck out here and I 'm the fifth 
owner of that truck. Well ,  I paid tax . I 've got a truck right now I have to 
go down there and register. I 'm going to have to pay tax on that and ain't  
no telling how many people has done that. I don't understand why you 
have to do that. Vehicles is one of the most things being taxed. You 
should pay taxes the one time you buy it and that should be it in my 
opinion. But that 's not how it works. 






unfairness of the tax system, the owners who were overpaying their taxes believed the tax 
system was fair. Their perceptions of tax fairness served to justify their compliance. 
They [other owners] don't appreciate what we have as much as some do. 
People that pay all of their taxes appreciate the way we live in this country 
more than those that hide money from taxes. You know not being bossed 
around by Taliban, stuff like that. You know I appreciate that. 
Compensating for Long Hours and a Lack of Benefits 
Similar to participants' dissatisfaction with the tax system was their discontent 
with the long hours and the lack of benefits associated with being small business owners. 
Many of the owners were frustrated by the long hours they worked without vacations and 
by the high costs of personal and family medical insurance, liability insurance and 
workman's compensation. 
Not many people do that [keep money back for owed taxes] because of 
cash flow problems. You have that money and you need to pay bills or 
something comes up or you need something for the job and you have to 
use the money. By the time everything comes out, you don't make that 
much anyway. Like on about $50,000 after a contractor take their 18% 
and then the 12% for workman's comp and then more for liability and then 
if I keep taxes out, I end up with about $ 18,000. And I don' t have any 
benefits. 
People say, "Boy, you made that much money today." They don't know 
what comes out that today. What I pay in taxes, what I pay in insurance. 
Don' t get me wrong, I mean as long as I can work and [spouse] can stay 
home raising these kids, that's what I agreed to do when we got married. 
But it's hard, you know what I'm saying. When you have to take your 
health insurance. Everything I make, everything comes out of it. 
Like for instance, health care. You get like us. We don't have healthcare. 
And I tried to get the kids on Tenn Care like twice even temporarily. As 
someone who pays taxes and spends a lot of damn money in a year's time, 
it kinda pisses me off. I see people bailing out. Like my family members, 
crack addicts that get several thousand dollars a month and the 
government and every damn thing else and it makes me mad. 
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The unrest of these owners led them to compensate for their perceived losses by 





UNIT ARY OR DIVERSE PHENOMENON 
The bulk of the paper, thus far, has centered around compliance with tax 
requirements. The last research objective introduces compliance with other regulatory 
requirements into the study. Specifically, the study examined the degree to which tax 
compliance paralleled regulatory compliance for the owners of small building and 
construction firms participating in the study. Research has shown that there appears to be 
very little offense specialization for the vast majority of street offenders (Petersila, et. al. , 
1978; Peterson and Baker, 1980; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982). Whether noncompliance 
is confined to one of area of regulation or shows a pattern of dispersal across multiple 
areas and regulatory programs is an unexplored area of research into tax and regulatory 
compliance. 
In order to explore whether tax compliance was a unitary or diverse phenomenon 
among the participants, I inquired into their compliance with regulatory requirements at 
the close of interviews. As discussed earlier, it was initially planned to examine their 
compliance exclusively with OSHA standards. Early into the study, though, it was 
learned that not all of the participants fell under OSHA requirements but that all 
participants were required to abide by some type of regulatory requirement. The type of 
standards participants were required to follow often depended on the type and size of 
jobs. To compensate for the differences in regulatory standards among participants, 
compliance with regulatory requirements was generally examined. In other words, rather 
than looking for compliance levels with a specific requirement, determining participants ' 
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overall compliance level with regulatory requirements became the objective. 
Comparisons of tax compliance and regulatory compliance were made by grouping 
participants by the taxpaying behavior they most often practiced. The results are 
presented in this manner. 
Failing to File an Annual Tax Statement 
Six participants admitted that they did not file an annual tax statement; they were 
completely noncompliant with tax requirements. All of these participants also admitted 
that they did not follow any regulatory requirements. Additionally, they did not carry 
liability insurance or workman's compensation insurance unless forced by a contractor as 
a condition of a particular job. In these cases, the contractor carried the insurance and 
subtracted the cost from the payment for the job. One of the owners confided that they 
did not usually even carry auto insurance on their work vehicles. One participant 
described a government job that the owner and crew walked off because of regulatory 
requirements. 
We walked off a job one time. Like it was a government apartment 
building that the government financed. They had, we had, we done half of 
them and all of a sudden they came in and "you have to wear steel-toed 
shoes and hard hats." I mean that's just not something you could do 
easily. Like with steel-toed boots, your feet didn't bend and you're 
wearing a hard hat and the thing would fly off against the wall or 
something . . .  we just went and told them we weren't doing that and we 
left. 
This description was not typical among these noncompliant owners. Usually they 
worked residential jobs and avoided work that would put them in contact with authorities. 
As one owner stated, "I don't take the big jobs that make you do all that stuff . . .  I don't 
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need no one telling how I need to do things." 
Failing to Report Income-Side Businesses 
Three owners operated side businesses and failed to report any income from their 
businesses. These three owners also reported that they typically did not follow any 
regulatory guidelines. This group of owners described scheming to avoid detection by 
regulatory authorities just as they had described efforts to avoid paying taxes on income 
earned from their businesses. While they were adamant in contending that they followed 
"common sense" safety standards, they made no effort to hide that their primary motive 
was to tum in low bids and make a profit. 
Most of the homeowners feel it is their home and no one's business what 
they are doing to their home. They don't want to hassle with all that stuff. 
You know also they don't want to know about all of those requirements. 
If you tell them they are going to have to have permits and inspections and 
all that stuff they are going find someone else who isn't going to make 
them hassle with it. . .  It's just common sense on what you have to do to 
stay safe and do it right. I mean you know what you're doing. You aren' t 
going to do stupid things. You know what's smart to do. Okay, you do 
things because how it is done because of someone putting it in a book. 
We won't win jobs on a bid if you comply with OSHA one hundred 
percent. Then you won't get any jobs . . . It's just too much money and 
safety . . .  [if you comply] they'll get the next person . . . I mean you would 
lose a lot of work if you gave prices according to OSHA regulations. 
While profit was a primary motive, the owners of side businesses also wanted to 
maintain the anonymity of their businesses. As one stated, "You don' t want to get tied up 
in the system. That's why I keep it on the side." 
Maximizing Deductions-Professional 
Two participants were identified as professional business owners who maximized 
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deductions. They reported being highly compliant with tax requirements operating within 
the system to minimize their tax burden. They also reported high compliance with 
regulatory requirements. 
You know we are required by law and I have to keep up with that to 
maintain the business. So I mean the state required it be done by the 
requirements and that' s what we do and people know that or in my 
business you don't work. I mean we are held by standards and contractors 
know that. You can't do business if you don't. 
I keep up with everything. The fire marshal is probably the biggest thing I 
have to keep up with. They come by every two to three months and walk 
around and look at the place and make recommendations or write you up 
and check. I keep up with it. . .  Everything is by the book. It' s  not worth 
hurting people. You know it' s  there to protect people so we try to stay 
good so there is no reason to try to beat the system . . .  Some people may 
say fuck it and not do it totally by the book but I do it all by the book. 
Interestingly, though, the last quote came from the same owner who reported high 
tax compliance while alluding to possible improprieties in completing tax requirements. 
The same was found while this participant discussed compliance with regulatory 
requirements. The above quote followed the next quote describing noncompliance with 
standards. 
Everytime you work on one of those doors, you have to bring it back into 
your UL listed shop that has been inspected and work on it there. You 
can't work on it out in the field . . .  That is good for us because we can 
charge for four hours instead of one. You know it is good for us but it is a 
pain in the ass sometimes. Now, sometimes we do run it around the side 
of the building and cut it at the truck and bring it back in and say we didn't 
get that much traffic. 
The participant was asked about the inconsistencies in his philosophies and 
actions. 
PI: What about when you take a door around the side and cut it, how do 
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you account for that? 
Subject: It just saves the hassle fo bringing it in. It doesn't compromise 
safety. We only do that on little jobs and know what the regulations are 
for it so it is really by the book. . .  Just time-saving not safety or 
requirements. 
While it was important to take this participant's word with a grain of the 
proverbial salt, he was at least consistent. 
Maximizine Deductions-Non-Professional 
Six non-professional business owners in the study maximized deductions as their 
primary taxpaying behavior. Results in comparing their levels of tax and regulatory 
compliance were varied. Two of these participants considered themselves as highly 
compliant in both tax and regulatory compliance. For the others, their tax and regulatory 
compliance did not parallel each other. 
Falsifyine Records 
Falsifying records was the primary taxpaying behavior for five of the small 
business owners participating in the study. These owners admitted shifting expenses on 
their tax return to their benefit and they did not always claim cash income. They all 
identified themselves as moderately compliant with tax requirements. As for regulatory 
requirements, they claimed to be moderately compliant (N=3) or highly compliant (N=2). 
The participants who were moderately compliant in both arenas appeared to focus on the 
day to day operation of their businesses with little foresight; they were just trying to make 
ends meet in the present. 
I'm about 70% [compliant with regulatory requirements]. I mean I try to. 
I mean there are some things just like going down the road with a machine 
chained down. They require two chains. I don't put two chains down . . .  
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unless I 'm going to Knoxville. But if I 'm just going down the road, I 
won't even chain one [piece of heavy equipment] . . .  I just got an $800 
fine for using another person ' s  equipment whose wasn't up to par. I just 
had that feeling I' d end up getting caught. Well, I did. I didn't know not 
even his headlights would work on his truck. 
The two owners who were moderately compliant in their tax requirements but 
highly compliant with regulatory standards appeared to place a premium on safety. Their 
commitment to safety appeared to be the catalyst driving their higher level of compliance 
with regulations .  
Subject: I checked into things when I first started and we are more than 
sufficient. This doesn 't matter whether they have standards or not, it's just 
the way I do business. Safety is the main thing. 
Spouse: We are all over it. 
Subject: I mean we even watch each other. They [employees] remind us 
even if we forget to put on our glasses. We are all in this together. We 
live the safety things. 
Overpaying 
Three owners reported claiming all income and understating deductions on their 
annual tax statements leading them to overcomply with their tax obligations. 
Summarizing from earlier, they were concerned primarily with the labor tasks at hand and 
with keeping business matters simple. Their simplicity in taxpaying paralleled their 
attitude toward regulatory requirements. This same attitude, however, led to 
noncompliance with regulatory requirements. 
PI: Are you under any regulatory guidelines, like OSHA requirements? 
Subject: Probably but I don't know who they are. 
PI: They would be like the safety people who may come to jobs to see if 
you are following saftey standards. You know like requirements to wear 
hardhats, have first aid, use harnesses. 
Subject. No. Nobody comes out and checks on jobs . I don 't  need 
anybody to check on anything. I just do my work. 
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PI: What about any other types of regulatory requirements? 
Subject: No. 
PI: Do you carry any business insurance or workman's comp? 
Subject: No. 
The other two participants who overpaid their taxes responded similarly to 




This thesis opened with a brief description of the theoretical foundations 
supporting regulatory approaches to enhance business compliance with regulatory and tax 
requirements. To summarize, a binary model of enforcement had been the center of 
debate for researchers and policy makers (Hutter, 1989, Braithwaite, 2002). The two 
approaches at issue involved command-and-control regulation grounded in principles of 
rational choice theory and cooperative regulation based on normative theories. The 
command-and-control approach assumes that individuals are driven by self-interest and 
that compliance decisions are made based on an evaluation of the utility of considered 
actions and the risk of detection and subsequent sanctions. This approach prescribes rules 
and responses to violations and mandates sanctions to offset perceived benefits of 
noncompliance. Cooperative regulation assumes individuals in the business community 
are respectable citizens and when treated as such they will comply with rules and 
regulations. Strategies to secure compliance include persuasion, negotiation and 
education (Tyler, 1990). 
Responsive regulation moved beyond the dichotomous debate and proposed a 
"holistic approach toward regulation in which mixes of regulatory strategies appeal to the 
complexity and variety of motivations underlying compliance" (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992; Parker, 2000: 535). Responsive regulation assumes a wide range of motivations 
influence business noncompliance from inadvertent error to self-interest but posits most 
businesses tend toward compliance with little to no state intervention. It suggests a 
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dialogue-based approach to elicit compliance backed up by willingness to use sanctions if 
necessary (Braithwaite, 2002). Soliciting and maintaining engagement in the regulatory 
process is a fundamental aim. In the past decade, regulatory and tax enforcement 
agencies have begun to move toward programs of responsive regulation. 
The motivations driving compliance are at the core of theoretical differences 
among regulatory strategies. Research into motivations for regulatory compliance have a 
longer history than those for tax compliance but both reach a similar conclusion: self­
interest and a fear of sanctions are among many motivations that account for compliance 
and noncompliance. Some of the more notable additional factors suggested to determine 
compliance include civic duty, moral beliefs, perceived fairness and legitimacy of 
requirements, and law complexity. Investigations aimed at understanding compliance 
behavior, however, has been limited and results are not conclusive. Additionally, there 
have been few qualitative studies into taxpaying behavior. 
The fundamental goal of the current study was to provide an increased 
understanding of tax noncompliance in the small building and construction industry. To 
this end, the study used qualitative interviews with 25 owners of small building and 
construction firms to learn about their taxpaying behaviors, the motivations driving their 
behavior and their compliance across different arenas. Five primary conclusions are 
suggested from the findings of this research. 
First, results lend support to the fundamental tenets of responsive regulation. 
Most of the participants were engaged in the tax system and considered themselves 
moderately to highly compliant. These participants reported consistently that the threat of 
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financial sanctions helped motivate them to comply with basic requirements. However, 
those who had been the recipients of sanctions developed resentments toward tax 
authorities. The resentments led participants to adopt noncompliant behaviors by 
maximizing deductions and underreporting income. One participant disengaged entirely 
from the tax system after difficulties meeting sanction requirements. For those 
participants disengaged from the tax system, the threat of legal consequences served little 
but to perpetuate distance from the tax system or made no difference at all. 
Second, most owners in the study described being unprepared to take on the 
responsibilities and tax requirements of a business. Many participants recounted stories 
of trial and error in learning to operate their businesses and negotiate tax obligations. 
Often times, the lack of skills led to inadvertent errors and situations in which the owner 
was attempting to just make ends meet. At other times, participants turned to the 
assistance of an accountant or tax preparer to complete tax returns. In these cases, the 
overriding goal shifted from obtaining assistance to minimizing the tax burden and 
avoiding the scrutiny of tax authorities. 
Third, results from the study provide evidence that taxpayers are more dynamic 
than the model "amoral calculators." Likewise, tax compliance and noncompliance are 
not the dichotomous dependent variables they often times appear; tax and regulatory 
requirements comprise many affirmative requirements and practices through the year as 
well as a lifetime. In accordance with contemporary rational choice theory, motivations 
varied among the different taxpaying requirements suggesting decision making in regard 
to tax compliance may be "requirement specific." 
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Finally, findings concerning the most noncompliant participants paralleled 
findings in the criminological literature of street offenders. Two particular findings 
especially illustrate this point. For one, results suggest developing and maintaining stakes 
in conformity or social capital was an important factor driving tax compliance. 
Alternatively, a lack of such stakes appeared related to the most noncompliant behavior 
of the most noncompliant participants. For another, the most tax noncompliant business 
owners in the study were also among the most noncompliant with regulatory 
requirements. 
While the results of this study provide some interesting insights into taxpaying 
behavior, the limitations of the study must be taken into account. Because the sample is 
small and nonrandom and limited to a specific geographical region, the results cannot be 
generalized to the general population of owners of small building and construction firms. 
Similarly, since the study focused on one industry, results cannot be generalized to other 
industries. Furthermore, in using a snowball sampling technique, the selection of 
participants was dependent on the subjective referrals of the initially selected participants. 
This may have led to a sample that was "densely interconnected" (Heckerthom, 2002). In 
other words, the sample may be unrepresentative even for participants in the same region 
and industry as in the case of this study since like social groups tend toward each other. 
The limitations, however, serve to highlight the need to replicate research of this type and 
to do such for other industries and in other regions. The volume of criminological 
research has increased its reliability and made significant contributions to crime control 
and prevention policy. 
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Despite its limitations, the results of the study point to several implications that 
may be important for informing policy and future research. First, the restructuring of tax 
offices to offer education and assistance may be a promising goal especially considering 
the lack of business and taxpaying skills displayed by participants in this study. 
However, trust for tax authorities will need to improve dramatically, at least among the 
participants in this study, before this goal may be realized. As results indicated, many 
participants sought the help of and paid for the services of a tax adviser or preparer and in 
return anticipated a reduction of their tax burden. Free assistance from IRS officials may 
reduce this expectation as well as the influence of private tax advisers seeking to secure 
and maintain a consumer base through services that minimize tax payments. An 
additional and possibly more effective strategy on a structural level may be to incorporate 
taxpaying education in the public school system. 
Next, the results suggest criminological theory and research may have important 
implications for the study of compliance. Criminological investigations have done much 
to inform law enforcement, policy makers and the judiciary in dealing more effectively 
with individuals through the criminal justice system. Replicating these types of studies in 
the area of business compliance and especially noncompliance may do the same for 
regulatory and tax enforcement agencies. 
Finally, the results theoretically support the recent policy developments toward 
responsive regulation to enhance regulatory and tax compliance. However, the recency of 
these developments have inhibited research into the actual effects of these changes. This 
tum in events offers many opportunities for compliance research and policy evaluation 
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alike. While the legacy of criminological research may help inform investigation into 
business compliance, research into changes in regulatory and tax enforcement may serve 
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EducationN ocational Training 
Employment History 
Business History 
Type of business 
How learned business 
How long in business 
Employees 
How many 
Type-fulltime, parttime, regular, irregular 
How paid-check, cash 




Type-residential , commercial, government 
Payment types-check, cash, barter 
Bookkeeping Practices 
Who keeps books 
How keep books-payments, employee income, expenses 
Taxpaying Practices 
File-self-employed, sole proprietor, corporate 
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